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This study explored the ways in which different stakeholders, namely researchers, community 
members and representatives define and understand ethically problematic scenarios with respect 
to research. The intention was to understand the tensions within ethical decision-making as a 
result of competing conceptions of the self, namely, autonomous and relational conceptions of 
the self. A hypothetical case scenario, mirroring real life experiences, was used to elicit 
participants’ understandings of ethical dilemmas. Thematic analysis was employed in the 
analysis of interview data. Results show that all stakeholders understand ethical dilemmas with 
reference to benefit sharing, communal and individual ownership of knowledge, and different 
ways of knowing and validating knowledge. Tensions were noted throughout these 
understandings, especially in relation to individualistic and communal concepts of the self.  It is 
recommended that indigenous epistemologies should be acknowledged as vital components in 
research into the experiences of local communities in particular.  Research should be considered 
as a joint process whereby research participants and communities engage on an equal basis with 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background to the research 
The indigenous people’s lived experiences have been misinterpreted, misguided and 
misrepresented as they have for a long time been studied by people outside of their context 
(Ermine, Sinclair & Jeffery 2004; Gbadegesin, 1998; Kigongo, n.d.; Mkhize, 2004; Ramose, 
2002; Verhoef & Michel, 1997).  The occurrence of these misguided interpretations was 
informed and perpetuated by the belief in universal science, the assumption that human beings 
are intrinsically the same (Mkhize, 2004).  This has been evident in cross-cultural studies which 
take the existing theories from Western cultures in an attempt to generalise them to other cultures 
(Kim & Berry, 1993).  Concepts such as cognition, motivation and intelligence, to mention but a 
few, have been widely generalised in studies on indigenous people. Where differences were 
observed, indigenous people were said to be inferior to the West. This disregards the cultural 
variability that exists between and within people in different contexts (Mkhize, 2004).  It also 
does not consider the ‘situatedness’ of concepts such as health and illness and therefore the 
variability in cultural understanding of concepts such as wisdom, intelligence and illness.  Thus, 
tensions may develop between people being studied and the researchers as they may not have the 
same understanding of each other and possibly concepts being studied.  
 
The current study seeks to understand conceptions in the minds of researchers, community 
members and community representatives of what constitutes an ethical dilemma or problem and 
hence, an appropriate resolution thereof.  This study was motivated by observations, writings and 
publications by some African and non-Western scholars concerning the different ways in which 
people engage in decision-making processes given certain ethical challenges.  While a number of 
distinct strands of Western ethics, such as virtue ethics, utilitarian ethics, principlism stands out 
as the dominant strand especially in health research ethics.  For a long time, it was assumed that 
principlism was the only inherent way applicable in thinking about and solving ethical dilemmas 




Kitchener, 2000).  Principlism applies an abstract approach to ethical decision-making.  African 
and non-Western scholars, on the other hand, assume that differences in the resolution of an 
ethical dilemma are likely to arise from varying factors such as differing conceptions of human 
relationships, socialisation into the research process, and assumptions about research ethics in 
general.   
 
Ethics constitute a very important part of research.  In fact no research study can begin without 
ethical approval.  All institutions of learning and major research institutions have over the years 
formed ethics committees to scrutinise all research proposals to check if the researcher has 
thoroughly thought about his or her study and the impact it might have on the participants.  
Careful consideration of ethical issues before the research process is underway is important to 
prevent exploitation in addition to all possible risks and abuses that the research participants may 
suffer intentionally or unintentionally as a result of the study.  The Nazi experiments, the 
Tuskegee syphilis experiment and the Milgram study are three of the well-known cases where 
human subjects were exposed to horrifying abuses and exploitation in the name of research 
(Fisher, 2007; Toldson & Toldson, 2001).  The discovery of unethical research conduct such as 
those mentioned above led to the development of the Nuremberg code of ethics, and later the 
Declaration of Helsinki and other ethics codes, in an attempt to protect human subjects 
participating in all research studies (Fisher, 2007).    
 
Inevitably, ethical problems, often involving conflict about the ‘right’ thing to do, do arise in 
research and it becomes the responsibility of the researcher to assure that all stakeholders are 
safe, properly benefited, not exploited and have autonomously agreed to the process.  Therefore, 
it is the responsibility of the researcher to ensure that the participants are well informed about 
what the research entails before they give their consent to participate in the research study.  This 
process of informing research participants is vital in research.  However, researchers need to be 
aware of and understand that different cultural groups and communities have different ways of 




Sue, 1999).  In every research study, there is a considerable likelihood that researchers and 
research participants do not have a shared understanding of what constitutes an ethically 
problematic situation, by virtue of their relative cultural backgrounds and historical contexts, the 
assumptions they bring to bear to the task as well as their socialisation in different communities 
of practice.  
 
Additionally, the idea of the current study arose from the review of the literature, which pointed 
at a gap between traditional psychology and the realities of practising psychology in the African 
and other non-Western contexts, which do not fully identify with the Western traditions.  The 
past few years have seen the slow development of non-Western psychologies; scholars are 
starting to question the implied universal way of resolving ethical dilemmas found within 
mainstream Western epistemology.  Scholars outside the Western traditional framework have 
been arguing for culturally-specific methods and procedures of engaging with and resolving 
ethical dilemmas or problems (Doumbo, 2005; Mkhize, 2004; Queener & Martin, 2001).  This 
research study is an attempt to investigate other ways in which people engage in decision-
making.  The study attempts to establish the relationship between autonomy and relatedness in 
ethical decision-making.   
 
1.2. Justification for the research 
The current study is important for two major reasons.  Firstly, it investigates understanding of 
research ethics and decision-making processes amongst different stakeholders, namely 
researchers, community members and community representatives.  These are the main parties 
working collaboratively for a sustained period throughout the research process.  Despite their 
prolonged interaction during the research process, it does not necessarily follow that these parties 
share the same assumptions about the research process, including their understanding of concepts 
fundamental to the ethicality of the research, such as autonomy and justice.  Thus, this study 
intends to investigate the stakeholders’ understanding of what constitutes an ethically 




understanding.  The study does not seek to reinforce the antinomy or conflict between 
individualistic and communal understanding of what constitutes ethically dilemmatic scenarios, 
as between-individual and even intra-individual tensions between these two poles of 
understanding are envisaged (Mkhize, 2004).  Rather, the research seeks to study the nature of 
these tensions, how they are manifested within the context of (unequal) power relations and to 
explore mechanisms by which the tensions could be resolved.  
 
Secondly, given the proliferation of biomedical and other research in Africa and developing 
societies in general (e.g. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 1999), it is important to study different 
stakeholders’ conceptions of ethics in different contexts.  This is particularly important in view 
of other studies that have been critical of the universalising tendencies in moral reasoning in 
general, and in ethics in particular (e.g. Edwards, 1978; Harkness et al., 1981, cited in Verhoef & 
Michel, 1997; Gilligan, 1977; Lyons, 1988). Further, the study is motivated by the calls for 
researchers to tap into alternative and/or indigenous ways of knowing about the self and the 
world in resolving ethical and moral concerns (Doumbo, 2005; Gbadegesin, 1993; Mkhize, 
2006; Sinha, 1997; Tschudin, 2006).  This study intends to help researchers, local and 
international, to better understand dilemmas arising from competing ethical and moral systems 
(Brodwin, 2001).  
 
1.3. Study Objectives and Research Questions 
The study seeks to understand how the process of ethical decision-making is related to either 
concepts of the self or more specifically, the tensions within ethical decision-making resulting 
from competing conceptions of the self.  The competing conceptions of the self are between the 
autonomous and relational conceptions of the self.  The autonomous conception of the self is 
associated with the Western worldview and epistemology.  This is a conception of a self that is 
considered to be free from significant associations.  Generally considered a solitary term, this 
self engages in decision-making with reference to internally-held, universal and timeless 




connected to other selves via concrete relational and historical ties; this self values a socially-
negotiated account to decision-making (Doumbo, 2005; Mkhize, 2006). 
  
Broadly, this study seeks to understand how different stakeholders, namely researchers, 
community members and representatives define and understand ethically problematic scenarios.  
It is assumed that people’s participation in various cultural systems will have a bearing on their 
definitions of what constitutes ethical and moral behaviour (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 
Matsumoto, 2003, 2006; Triandis, 1989).  Autonomy and relatedness are not conceptualised as 
independent variables in this study.  Thus the study rejects the individualism-collectivism 
antimony; instead, it is the possible interpenetration of the two, in a society characterised by 
rapid and unstable social changes, which is of interest.  While the subjects of the investigation 
are researchers and community members/representatives, the possibility was not ruled out that 
competing idea systems and conceptions of the self could occur intra-individually within a single 
person, leading to complex ethical tensions. 
 
The key objectives of the study are: 
(a) To identify researchers’, research participants’ and community representatives’ 
understandings and definitions of ethical dilemmas, with reference to autonomy and 
relatedness;  
(b) To contribute to the growing theoretical and empirical body of knowledge on 
African/indigenous approaches to ethics;  
(c) To show that the principles of relatedness and autonomy could possibly exist 
simultaneously within the person, leading to tensions in ethical decision-making;  
(d) To shed insight into the process by which tensions between autonomy and relatedness are 
resolved in ethical decision-making. 
 





(a) How do researchers, community members and representatives (e.g. community advisory 
board members (CABs), community leaders) define what constitutes an ethical dilemma? 
 (b) How do autonomy and relatedness relate to ethical decision-making (i.e. resolution of an 
ethical problem) for (a) researchers, (b) community members, and (c) community 
representatives? 
 
1.4. Summary of Methodology 
Three groups of participants were targeted in this study: researchers, community representatives 
and members of the community who have participated in social science or health-related 
research (and, for contrasting purposes, community members who have not participated in 
research).  Researchers were sampled mainly from the local university and a major research 
institution in KwaZulu-Natal.  Participation in community, social science and health-related 
research was the main inclusion criterion for researchers.  Community members were sampled 
from the local Pietermaritzburg community.  The study employed a qualitative research design.  
This research design was appropriate because the study intended to investigate the lived 
experiences of the participants, especially related to how they engage in decision-making 
processes.  The study used non-probability, purposeful, snowballing and maximum variation 
sampling techniques.  This was because the purpose of the study was to find information-rich 
cases that were studied and analysed in depth using thematic analysis (Maxwell, 1998; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2001).  
 
1.5. Definitions 
This section defines the key and controversial terms to establish the position taken in this 
research study.  
a) Autonomous/ independent self: it is self defined as a “sense of self that views the self 
as a bounded entity, clearly separated from relevant others” (Matsumoto, 1996, p.56).  




with Western culture (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Benhabib, 1992; Brodwin, 2001; 
Gilligan, 1977; Mkhize, 2004).  
b) Communal/interdependent self: a construal of the self defined as “a sense of self that 
views the self as unbounded, flexible, and contingent on context” (Matsumoto, 1996, 
p.56).  This view of the self incorporates the principle of relatedness which is 
associated with the view that a human being is closely connected to fellow human 
beings.     
c) Western: For the purposes of this research study, the term ‘Western’ will be used to 
refer to the dominant mindset of Western or European culture that has been 
generalised to other cultural groups nationally and internationally. Specifically, the 
term refers to a materialistic approach to the world which is characterised by 
objectivity, mind-matter dualism and the search for universal and timeless principles, 
to mention but a few (Myers, 1993).  It is duly acknowledged that alternative 
conceptualisations also exist even in the Western world albeit at the margins of 
scholarly or scientific discourse.  Most importantly, Western philosophies which form 
the basis of most ethics theories tend to be based on this mindset (Ermine et al., 2004; 
Matsumoto, 1996).  It thus represents observations, knowledge systems, values and 
beliefs that are derived from the lived experiences of people in European or Western 
countries (Ermine et al., 2004).  
d) African/non-Western: These terms are used to mean people of African descent as well 
as the non-Western indigenous groups that subscribe to a mindset or worldview 
characterised by spirituality, interdependence and a holistic approach to life (Grills, 
2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Mkhize, 2004; Wiredu, 1996). 
e) Indigenous psychologies: “a system of psychological thought and practice that is 
rooted in a particular cultural tradition” (Enriquez, 1990, as cited in Sinha, 1997, 
p.132).  It tries to develop particular assumptions, theories, metaphors, or a 
“behavioral science that matches the sociocultural realities of one’s own society” 




f) Indigenous knowledge: “systematic body of knowledge acquired by local people 
through the accumulation of experiences, informal experiments and intimate 
understanding of the environment in a given culture” (Msuya, 2007).  
g) Colonization: “both the formal and informal methods (behaviors, ideologies, 
institutions, policies, and economies) that maintain the subjugation or exploitation of 
Indigenous Peoples, lands and resources” (Wilson & Bird, 2005, as cited from 
McCaslin & Breton, 2008, p.511).  
 
1.6. Outline of this report 
Chapter 1 of this report provides the background to the research, as well as the research 
questions, the justification for the research, and a brief summary of the methodology to be used.  
In addition, this chapter includes the outline of the report, definitions, delimitations of scope and 
key assumptions.  Chapter 2 reviews the literature relevant to the study.  The chapter builds a 
theoretical foundation for the thesis in order to identify controversial issues that have not been 
answered in previous research.  Attempts are made to link the research problems to the wider 
body of knowledge.  Chapter 3 is the methodology section and covers sampling (units of 
analysis, sampling frame, etc), justification for the methodology with reference to the problem 
and the literature reviewed, interview schedules and procedures used in data collection, 
limitations of the methodology, and ethical considerations.  Results are presented and discussed 
in Chapter 4.  Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by highlighting conclusions vis-à-vis the 
research questions, conclusions regarding the research problem, and implications for research, 
theory, policy and practice.  The study limitations are also indicated.  
 
1.7. Delimitations of scope and key assumptions 
The participants of this research were the three stakeholders in research, namely, researchers, 
community members and community representatives.  All of them were black South Africans.  




and that is why all the interviews were conducted in both isiZulu and English.  Therefore, the 
findings of this research cannot be generalisable to all research stakeholders as not all of them 
were equally represented in this research.  
 
1.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has laid the foundation of this thesis in that it presented background information to 
this research study.  The research questions and objectives were stated as were the rationale and 
justification for the study.  A brief summary of the research methodology was given, and the key 
terms were defined.  The delimitations and scope of the study were highlighted.  The following 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents a review of the literature relevant to this research study.  This research 
study explores conceptions of self, how people view ethics, and how they engage in decision-
making, especially in the research context.  The chapter begins with a definition of the concept of 
a worldview and proceeds to introduce and discuss the theoretical underpinnings of Western and 
African worldviews.  The discussion presents general trends; it does not imply that the two 
worldviews are mutually exclusive (Myers, 1993).  The two worldviews are then contrasted in 
terms of how they each define the concept of an ethical self, leading up to a discussion of the 
implications of these worldviews on ethical decision-making. 
 
2.2.  Western and African Worldviews 
A worldview is a “set of basic assumptions that a group of people develops in order to explain 
reality and their place and purpose in the world” (Mkhize, 2004, p.25).  Worldviews are 
concerned with how people from different cultural backgrounds see the world and how they may 
value different events, ways of being and also how people deal with their life circumstances 
(Cottone & Tarvydas, 2007; Grills, 2004; Kambon, 1998; Sue & Sue, 1999).  Thus, they are 
deeply ingrained in people’s everyday lives as they engage with the self, others and their 
environment.  Worldviews are an integral part of the person’s being because they are what 
informs and shapes his or her attitudes and values in life (Cottone & Tarvydas, 2007; Mkhize, 
2004).  Sue and Sue (1999) add that worldviews “affect how we perceive and evaluate situations 
and how we determine appropriate actions based upon our appraisal” (p.165).  
 
Worldviews also enable people to share their opinions and beliefs about life, which has 




differ from each other because of their diverse societies that hold differing values, knowledge 
productions, historical and cultural contexts and backgrounds (Bujo, 2001; Cottone & Tarvydas, 
2007; Ermine et al., 2004; Gyekye, 1998; Mkhize, 2004; Murove, 2005; Ramose, 2002; Sue & 
Sue, 1999).  The different life experiences that people encounter because of their diverse cultural 
upbringing are not only evident in the differing values, beliefs and attitudes that they possess, the 
life experiences also inform how individuals think and act towards their world, that is, their 
frame of reference and their understanding of their existence in the world (Sue & Sue, 1999).  
 
The governance of human behaviour that culture provides forms “a common formulation of 
ideas including the intellectual, moral and aesthetic standards prevalent in a community and the 
meanings of communicative actions” (Gambu, 2000, p.7).  This then means that the standards of 
meaning and meaning itself in many societies are socially constructed or generated; that is, 
meaning cannot be made out of context or without taking cognisance of the social relationships 
in which the subject is embedded (Gambu, 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Mkhize, 2006).  
Shweder (1990) adds that culture refers to “persons, society, and nature as lit up and made 
possible by some already there intentional world, an intentional world composed of conceptions, 
evaluation, judgments, goals, and other mental representations already embodied in socially 
inherited institutions, [and] practices...” (p.101). Therefore culture is not simply a nuisance 
variable; it encompasses how people live and make meaning of their socio-cultural contexts.  
However, as has been stated above, the degree to which individuals are good cultural 
representatives differs (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
 
Sue and Sue (1999) maintain that the concept of a worldview has four critical elements, namely, 
cosmology, ontology, axiology and epistemology. Firstly, cosmology speaks about the structure 
of reality that people hold.  For example, in African culture reality is collective and 
interdependent; there is unity between humans and the surrounding environments.  In Western 
culture, conversely, the structure is characterised by separateness, independence and conflict 




cosmology in a way that they believe is the most important part of their nature (Grills, 2004; Sue 
& Sue; 1999).  For example, what is of core value to African culture is the spirituality that 
surrounds their existence and the universe; whereas the core value for Western culture is an over-
identification with one’s self in which the individual fights to preserve one’s ego.  It is also the 
belief that one’s existence in the universe is determined by the amount of one's material 
possessions (Sue & Sue, 1999).  As mentioned above, however, this does not mean that African 
people cannot be materialistic, nor is it implied that all Western people lack spirituality.  The 
focus of the study is on the dominant trends (Myers, 1993).  
 
Axiology concerns the fundamental structural value that is put forth when defining relationships 
between humans and nature (Grills, 2004; Sue & Sue, 1999).  Thus most African cultures are 
characterised by person-person relationships and much value is put on these human relationships; 
whereas in most Western cultures person-object relationships are valued (Sue & Sue, 1999).  
Epistemology is the system of knowing and understanding of the truth about reality based on 
people’s lived experiences, which stems from their different cultural, socio-political and 
historical contexts (Sue & Sue, 1999).  For example, African cultures place more “emphasis on 
Affective-Cognitive synthesis as a way of knowing reality” (Kambon 1998, p.123); whereas 
Western culture emphasises “Cognitive over Affective processes as the way of knowing reality” 
(Kambon, 1998, p.123).  Thinking and the application of logic is much more valued than feeling. 
In this dimension of worldviews, the reality of the world is seen as separate from human beings 
and “is physical, mechanical and follows rational laws” (Sue & Sue, 199, p.174).  The realities 
assumed by each component of the worldviews may reflect the differences that exist between 
African and Western epistemological assumptions.  
 
The Western and African worldviews are interesting to compare because of the unequal 
relationship that exists between them, with the former accorded more power and status than the 
latter.  For many years, African knowledge and discourse or worldviews have been dominated by 




Mkhize, 2004; Muller, 1994; Murove; 2005; Prozesky, n.d.; Ramose, 2002; Toldson & Toldson, 
2001).  This occurred because “Western-derived theories, which are assumed to be universal, 
have been imposed on the non-Western population” (Mkhize, 2004, p.25).  Such Western-driven 
theories are informed by research studies, which are conceptualised and formulated by theorists 
whose conceptual development is informed by and limited to their historical context.  Because of 
the highly influential power that the West has had on knowledge production and information 
dissemination, it has managed to marginalise indigenous people’s lived experiences (Mkhize, 
2004).  Grills (2004) argues that no one particular worldview should monopolise all knowledge 
systems as the Western paradigm has done for many centuries, especially in the field of 
psychology.  Grills further argues that other worldviews, like the African worldview, should be 
recognised because of their rich cultural observation, stories, practical life experiences, and so 
forth, that have been passed down from one generation to the other.  
 
There are many differences between Western and African worldviews, some of which have been 
expressed in the individualism versus collectivism dichotomy (Guss, 2002; Gyekye, 1998; 
Khoza, 1994, as cited by Prinsloo, 1998; Mkhize, 2004; Triandis, 1989), independent versus 
interdependent construal of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Matsumoto, 1996; 
Mkhize, 2004), autonomy versus relatedness modes of relating to self and others (Mkhize, 2006), 
and about ethics in the practice of research, especially in cross-cultural research (Ermine et al., 
2004; Simpson, 1974; Tschudin, 2006).  Three of the four components of worldviews presented 
above are most relevant to this study, namely the cosmology, axiology and the epistemology 
components.  These three components will be contrasted in terms of how each one explains the 
conceptions of an ethical self and the implications this has on decision-making in research and 
life in general.   
 
2.3. Defining the self: Conceptions of an ethical self 
The self is simply understood as the person’s basic understanding of the person he or she is 




that the individual has about himself or herself and how he or she construes his or her sense of 
self or being (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize, 2004; St. Clair, 1989).  It is 
also described as the nature and organisation of beliefs about one’s self that are multi-
dimensional in that it is both a “descriptive and an evaluative” phenomenon (Mboya, 1999, 
p.83).  The underlying assumption here is that it is possible to put a label or a list of attributes 
upon an individual which can be used to predict how others relate to that individual depending 
on their evaluations.  Evaluations can be done by self and significant others, as they often play a 
vital role in the formation of a positive or negative self-concept because it is through their 
feedback to the individual that he or she grows.  
 
The idea of self-concept or conceptions of the self, which forms the basis of this research study, 
is fundamental for practitioners embarking on human or social studies to explore and understand.  
This is mainly because the way people conceive themselves is vital to the way they interact with 
self, others (including researchers) and their surroundings (Burns, 1979; Matsumoto, 1996; 
Mboya, 1999; Mkhize, 2004; Nsamenang, 1999).  The concept of self has had scholars, mainly 
in Western countries, pondering and writing about it for centuries.  This notwithstanding, the 
failure to acknowledge the limitations of the definitions and the cultural specificity of the 
concept of self contributes to its elusiveness (Matsumoto, 1996).  This argument is supported by 
Burns (1979), when he argued that the conception of self “acts as a selective screen, the 
permeability of which is determined by individual developmental history and the nature of the 
environment relative to the person” (p.31). 
 
In light of the above, it can be argued that conceptions of the self differ according to different 
cultural contexts and worldviews.  However, this is not to say that people in the same cultural 
contexts will have exactly the same conceptions of self; they may have similar modes of 
interaction with self and others (Mboya, 1999; Mkhize, 2004; Nsamenang, 1999).  In this study, 
it is argued that the dominant Western and African conceptions of self differ from one another.  




years non-Western, including African scholars, have started counteracting the dominant voice of 
the West with regards to the conception of self and many other issues like morality and ethical 
decision-making, to mention a few (Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize 2004). 
 
2.4. Western conception of self: Autonomous self 
The cosmology of the autonomous view of the self is associated with terms such as 
‘individualism’, ‘independent’, ‘rational’ and with statements that consists of ‘I’ (Benhabib, 
1992; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize, 2004; Triandis, 1989).  
Individualism means “living as a distinct and unique being among equals” (Benhabib, 1992, 
p.56).  Khoza (1994:3, as cited in Prinsloo, 1998) also defined individualism in the same sense, 
stating that it is when an individual is “an end in himself and is of supreme value, society being 
only a means to individual ends” (p.44).  This conception of self is known as the independent 
construal of self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Matsumoto, 1996).  It basically talks of a self 
that is an entity which contains fundamental dispositional attributes and is disconnected from 
history and culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  This specifically means an individual who is 
able to “focus on personal internal attributes – individual ability, intelligence, personality traits, 
goals, or preference” (Matsumoto, 1996, p.38).  Furthermore, this idea holds that these internal 
attributes are generally unchangeable, or remain constant across time (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991, 2003; Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize, 2004). 
 
The dominant Western conception of the self is individualistic in that it is a “bounded entity 
consisting of a number of internal attributes that include needs, abilities, motives and rights” 
(Matsumoto, 1996, p.36).  An individual is uniquely made up of the internal attributes which 
have implications for his or her behaviour (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  This idea speaks of a 
self that is independent of any cultural prescriptions or heritage, as the individual is assumed to 
be responsible for creating his or her own destiny and is in control of the outcomes of his or her 
actions.  Neisser and Jopling (1997) define the self similarly, stating that a self is “a bounded, 




awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole set contrastively 
both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background” (p.4).  Mkhize 
(2004) also notes that the self in mainstream traditional psychology is conceived “as a bounded, 
autonomous entity: it is defined in terms of its internal attributes such as thoughts and emotions, 
independently of the social and contextual factors” (p.26).  Sue and Sue (1999), referred to 
people with an autonomous view of the self to have an internal locus of control and 
responsibility, where an individual relies on personal attributes for success and failure.  This is 
an individual-centered approach that accentuates self-reliance, individualism and uniqueness 
(Sue & Sue, 1999).   
 
A number of moral and ethical decision-making theories take the individualistic view of the self 
as their point of departure. For example, in Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, an 
individual is free from societal constraints, thus being able to make independent judgments about 
his or her needs and values (Benhabib, 1992; Gilligan, 1977; Simpson, 1974).  This conception 
draws from Kantian approaches, which take an abstract (“Generalized”) view of the self as their 
point of departure (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Benhabib, 1992; Brodwin, 2001; Gilligan, 
1977; Mkhize, 2004).  Benhabib (1992) states that the ‘Generalised Other’ “ requires us to view 
each and every individual as a rational being entitled to the same rights and duties we would 
want to ascribe to ourselves” (p.158).  Thus, this view accords that all human beings, regardless 
of their history and lived experience, should be assumed to be operating at the same level of 
moral reasoning, justice and being because their internal capabilities are virtually the same.  This 
view of the self is in direct contrast with the African view, which is communal and 
interdependently construed.  
 
Individuals in the Western context are socialised to value and pride themselves in their abilities 
to separate from others as self-reliant, self-contained beings.  This is consistent with the child-
rearing practices of most Western cultures where the processes of separation and individuation 




1986).  Using the psychoanalytic theory, a largely Western theory, as an example, the process of 
individuation involves an infant developing “intrapsychic autonomy” (St. Clair, 1986, p.110) and 
that of separation involving “psychological differentiation, distancing, and disengagement from 
the mother” (St. Clair, 1986, p.110).  A child in his or her early years is taught or encouraged by 
his or her parents to be self-reliant, independent and to develop boundaries between the self and 
others.  Individuals raised this way can thus be trusted to make individually informed decisions 
(Monroe, 2001; Triandis, 1989).   
 
The two processes mentioned above, namely separation and individuation, are thus crucial in the 
individual’s development of internal attributes that would develop a sense of self or “I” instead 
of “we”, which implies a conception of self that is very much individualistic in the sense that 
there is a “sharp distinction between the individual and the roles that he or she plays” (Perrett & 
Patterson, 1991, p.194).  The individual has to think about what is good for him or her before all 
others around him or her, his or her desires and wishes must therefore come before everyone 
else’s.  Thus, a person is perceived as an atomistic individual where he or she is disconnected 
from all of his or her relational spheres of being (Murove, 2005). 
 
While an individualistic view of the self is consistent with the dominant Western culture, it may 
not be generalised or applicable to all Western cultures.  That said, the assumption is that the 
average person in Western culture identifies with the independent view of the self more so than 
the average person in African and other non-Western cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  This 
is because, within any given culture, “individuals will vary in the extent to which they are good 
cultural representatives and construe the self in the mandated ways” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 
p.226).  This depends on the individual’s responsiveness to the community or the extent to which 
the individual is willing to sacrifice personal happiness for the greater good of the community.  
The responsiveness of the person to the community also depends on the underlying ethical values 




in Western thought, principlism, in order to show the relationship between the self and ethical 
decision-making.  
 
2.4.1. Theories of the autonomous self – Principlism 
Ethics can be defined as “the philosophical inquiry into principles of morality and right and 
wrong conduct” (Muller, 1994, p.448).  Ethics are considered fundamental in both Western and 
non-Western or African societies in relation to this study.  Conceptions of the philosophy of 
ethics will however differ much more between the two cultures than within the societies, in 
regards to their core practices (culture, socialisation, language, decision-making, etc) and the 
methods of carrying out their assumptions (Bujo, 2001; Engelhardt, 1996; Ermine et al., 2004; 
Gbadegesin, 1998; Guss, 2002; Mkhize, 2004; Prinsloo, 1998; Ramose, 2002; Simpson, 1974).  
The main difference between Western and African approaches to ethics is that the Western 
approach uses abstraction which applies universal principles rather than the concrete approach, 
which looks at the circumstances of the person making an ethical decision (Coetzee, 1998; 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 2003).  While it is recognised that there are other branches of ethics 
in Western thought, such as virtue ethics and utilitarian ethics, the current study focuses on 
principlism since this branch tends to dominate the research ethics domain. 
 
Principlism is a normative theory of ethics which could also be regarded as “principled thinking 
or the justice theory” (Tschudin, 2006, p.306).  Its fundamental base is that ethical dilemmas or 
problems should be considered from a standpoint which consists of a rational viewpoint, is fair-
minded and free from bias (Facione, Scherer, & Attig, 1991).  For this unbiased, fair-minded and 
rational standpoint to be achieved, the person attempting to make an ethical decision needs to be 
objective, impersonal and impartial (Facione et al., 1991; Kitchener, 2000; Tschudin, 2006).  
This enables a person to reach a decision that is justifiable, logical, and coherent and a decision 
that is not emotionally entangled regarding what should or ought to be done to resolve the ethical 
dilemma at hand.  Principlism is said to be a normative ethical theory, viewing ethical problems 




Therefore, the only resolution to an ethical dilemma would be to apply general ethical principles 
or universal moral standards (Facione et al., 1991; Kitchener, 2000; Tschudin, 2006).  A brief 
discussion of these four basic ethical principles follows. 
 
2.4.1.1. Ethical principles 
The ethical principles are a general but fundamental foundation of ethical codes that most 
professionals such as psychologists, medical practitioners and social scientists have to adhere to 
in order to prevent exploitation of human beings, especially in conducting research in developing 
countries (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Childress, 1983; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Kitchener, 
2000; Smith, 2000).  The ethical principles “provide a more consistent framework within which 
cases are considered” (Kitchener, 2000, p.11).  This is when the ethical principles are compared 
to ethical codes, as the latter may be too broad or too narrow depending on the cases at hand, 
especially in relation to human subjects participating in research (Beauchamp & Childress, 1983; 
Kitchener, 2000).  
 
The ethical principles were first introduced and defined in the Nuremberg Code and later 
reinterpreted in the Helsinki Declaration (Barry, 1988; Faden & Beauchamp, 1986).  These codes 
emphasised that the ethical principles “need to be interpreted and applied within different 
cultural settings, many of which were unfamiliar to the international bodies that originally 
formulated these principles” (Barry, 1988, p.1083).  Thus, careful consideration and sensitivity 
are needed at the level of application, especially in international or cross-cultural research.  
Careful consideration at the level of application is also important because, although ethical 
principles are said to be universal, some have argued that they are, in fact, higher order 
abstractions with varying local content (Macklin, 1999).  On the other hand, others have argued 
for ethical pluralism, citing the view that ethics codes are underpinned by differing philosophic 





There are four main ethical principles that are central when thinking about an ethical problem in 
research, namely, nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice and respect for autonomy (Barry, 1988; 
Beauchamp & Childress, 1983; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; 
Kitchener, 2000; Smith, 2000; Wassenaar, 2006).  The primary focus will be on the ethical 
principle of autonomy as it is the focal point of this study.  The rest of the principles will 
therefore not receive much attention.  That said, it is important to note that the above-mentioned 
ethical principles are not the only ethical principles that exist; they are just the ones most written 
about in the Western-driven theories.  It is possible for one to arrive at different principles should 
one start with different worldviews.  For example, Tschudin (2006) arrived at a different 
conclusion when she looked at ethics based on Tibetan Buddhism, which is essentially 
“philosophy and psychology that view ethical behavior as the foundation of spiritual growth and 
spirituality as essential for healing body and mind” (p.307).  
 
In no particular order of importance, there is the principle of nonmaleficence.  Nonmaleficence 
means that there should be no harm inflicted on the research participants directly or indirectly, 
intentionally or non-intentionally as a result of the research (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 
1989; Kitchener, 2000; Smith, 2000; Wassenaar, 2006).  This principle is rooted in Western 
medical science and was made popular by the phrase primum non nocere, which means “above 
all do no harm” (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989, p.30; Kitchener, 2000, p.22).  To harm a person 
generally means that the individual's interests are not considered and not viewed as important.  It 
also means that these interests and the well-being of the person are enormously diminished 
(Kitchener, 2000).  
 
The principle of nonmaleficence guards against risky behaviours on behalf of the researchers, 
intentional or otherwise, that may diminish the well-being and the interests of the research 
participants (Barry, 1988, Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Kitchener, 2000; Smith, 2000; 
Wassenaar, 2006).  Researchers thus have to make certain that harm is not inflicted on 




risks of everyday life) that the research might entail (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; 
Kitchener, 2000; Smith, 2000).  Failure to do so exposes participants to harm which not only 
diminishes and endangers their well-being, but also renders the research study unethical.  
 
However, the problem with the nonmaleficence ethical principle is that “the concept of harm is 
ambiguous” (Kitchener, 2000, p.22).  This is because what some may consider harmful may not 
be considered as such by others, especially when contrasting the Western and African 
conceptions of ethics and thus of nonmaleficence.  These two worldviews differ in their 
approach and application of this principle (Coetzee, 1998).  Although a spectrum of defining the 
concept of harm may exist within each worldview, a greater difference exists between the two 
worldviews, which leads to complications in how people participating in the research process 
understand the concept of harm and its implications.  In addition, what is considered an 
“ordinary everyday phenomenon” and hence less risky, may be considered too risky in another 
setting.  For example, going to school could be a risky affair for South African black children 
living in the township and informal settlements compared to South African white children in the 
suburbs, because the former have to travel long distances by means of the unpredictable taxi 
transport system. 
 
The second ethical principle is that of beneficence.  In research, this principle speaks of doing 
good for the benefit of research participants (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; 
Kitchener, 2000; Wassenaar, 2006).  Beneficence “obliges the researcher to attempt to maximize 
the benefits that the research will afford to the participants of the study” (Wassenaar, 2006, 
p.67).  This also entails that researchers should be competent, kind and charitable to the 
participants, actively doing good by minimising the risks and maximising the benefits of the 
research study (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Kitchener, 2000; Smith, 2000; 
Wassenaar, 2006).  This principle also means that the participants should not be injured or 
exploited while others, specifically researchers and funding companies, further their own 





The Nuremberg Code states that “[t]he degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that 
determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment” 
(Faden & Beauchamp, 1986, p.13).  Beneficence thus places an obligation on the researcher to 
balance the risk-benefit ratio of the research.  However, this principle of beneficence moves far 
beyond just being an obligation as it “generates general moral duties that are incumbent on 
everyone – not because of a professional role but because morality makes a general demand of 
beneficence” (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989, p.31, original emphasis).  The demand necessitates 
the protection of participants from being intentionally harmed in order to serve the interests of 
others.     
 
In summary, the principle of beneficence consists of two parts (Beauchamp & Childress, 1989; 
Kitchener, 2000).  Firstly, the research should have benefits for the research participants in ways 
that promote their well-being and social good (Kitchener, 2000).  It is however unclear what 
form these benefits should take, who decides on them and to what extent the participants are 
involved in this decision.  Secondly, it is essential to balance the consequences that would arise 
out of potential harm and benefits that the research study might have (Beauchamp & Childress, 
1994, as cited by Kitchener, 2000).  It is however very difficult to weigh the balance as 
sometimes the principle of beneficence may be in conflict with the principle of nonmaleficence, 
making it difficult to determine what would be deemed harmful considering that people in 
various societies living under different circumstances are informed by their contextual histories. 
 
The third principle is that of justice. Justice demands that there should be fairness and equity in 
the research process (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Benatar, 2002; Wassenaar, 
2006).  This principle has been studied more widely than the aforementioned principles, and has 
received more attention than the principle of autonomy (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989), discussed 
below.  The principle of justice is effective only when a person is treated in a fair manner by 




participant, including receiving all the benefits that the proposed study promised in lieu of 
participation (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989).  However, people may not have a common 
understanding of what justice is, which has the potential to give rise to more ethical dilemmas. 
 
Researchers and funders should not be the only ones benefiting from the proceeds of research.  
“Distributive justice”, the appropriate distribution of research benefits and problems between all 
the stakeholders, is important (Smith, 2000).  Research should respond to the needs of the society 
from which the sample is drawn.  Benatar (2002) argues that “while researchers are generally 
privileged people, many research subjects are amongst the most vulnerable in our world, living 
under the worst conditions of deprivation and exploitation” (p.1131).  Thus, the relationship that 
develops between researchers and participants is that of inequality.  Research ethics require that 
researchers refrain from taking advantage of vulnerable and/or less knowledgeable research 
participants.  The research should be justified and morally correct (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986).  
Above all, participants should be able to exercise their autonomy when they partake in any 
research study and whatever these are, they should be acknowledged and respected.   
 
2.4.1.2. The principle of Autonomy 
The principle of autonomy, the main focus of this study, is strongly associated with theorists 
such as Immanuel Kant, John Rawls and some liberal feminists.  Autonomy is understood with 
reference to the liberal Western tradition, which emphasises the importance of the person’s 
freedom of choice in political and personal matters (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; 
Engelhardt, 1996; Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Kitchener, 2000; Wassenaar, 2006).  Autonomy 
derives its meaning from the Greek autos (“self”) and nomos (“rule”), thus “self-rule” (Barry, 
1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Faden & Beauchamp, 1986).  According to this principle, 
individuals are self-governing; they are responsible for determining their destiny and fate (Sue & 
Sue, 1999).  Autonomy has been “analyzed in terms of external non-constraint and the presence 




therefore makes a claim that an individual’s fate is not determined by secondary factors such as 
culture, religion or the social context.  
 
Autonomy can be associated with expressions such as “privacy, choosing freely, choosing one’s 
own moral position, and accepting responsibility for one’s choices” (Beauchamp & Walters, 
1989, p.28), and “voluntary informed consent” (Wassenaar, 2006, p.67).  Thus, to be 
autonomous, people need not to be told, directed, forced or prevented to take whichever decision 
they feel is in their best interest.  Further, one needs to be able to live with the decision, because 
part of being an autonomous being is being able to live with one’s choices.  Beauchamp and 
Walters (1989) argue that “the burden of moral justification rests on those who would restrict or 
prevent a person’s exercise of autonomy” (p.29).  The same applies in research: for individuals 
to exercise their full autonomy, they need to be given a full account of the process in order to 
make an informed decision based on facts.  
 
The notion of autonomy rests partially on the Enlightenment idea of the individual as an 
unencumbered, solitary thinker, otherwise known as the “Generalized Other” (Benhabib, 1992).  
Sampson (1993) traced back the concept of the “Generalized Other” to the writings of Mead 
(1934) where he explained the notion of the “Generalized Other” to “represent the abstract 
addressee reflecting our particular group or community” (Sampson, 1993, p.140).  This idea 
speaks of a voice within each individual that conducts imaginary dialogue with the generalised 
community ensuring that another person is always present even in one’s most private and 
personal space (Sampson, 1993).  Thus each and every experience is abstractly not practically 
shared with others, because the “generalized other” is considered a rationally thinking being, 
same as the self (Benhabib, 1992).  That is why what the self would consider good for it will be 
accepted as being beneficial to all others as they will be applying similar methods in thinking 






It is important also to note, as Kitchener (2000) argued, that the four principles mentioned above 
are sometimes in conflict with one another as they sometimes offer contradictory advice to a 
person needing to make an ethical decision.  For example, a researcher may promise 
confidentiality to the participant of the research, but there are certain conditions under which 
sworn confidentiality may be broken to protect a greater number of people against harm.  These 
principles also serve to “direct the inquirer to a particular approach to the solution of the 
problem” (Engelhardt, 1996, p.103).  Thus, the principles “need to be interpreted and applied 
within different cultural settings, many of which were unfamiliar to the international bodies that 
originally formulated these principles” (Barry, 1988, p.1083).  It is not totally explicit that these 
ethical principles are culturally sensitive as they are informed by Western frames of reference 
and the assumption of universality.  In light of this, one may ask, how is autonomy as a universal 
principle applicable in different cultural contexts? 
 
2.4.1.3. Autonomy in Cross-cultural context 
In cross-cultural research studies in ethics, defined as “any type of research on human behavior 
that compares specific behaviours across two or more cultures” (Matsumoto, 1996, p.9), 
autonomy is considered a universal principle.  This means that it is understood to be equally 
applicable and conceived similarly in all cultures being compared or studied.  In practice, it is 
assumed that those involved in the research process, such as research participants, researchers, 
and community representatives (e.g. community advisory board members or CABs), have a 
common or shared understanding of the concept of autonomy, and hence will have a similar 
definition of what constitutes an ethically problematic situation, and the resolution thereof.  In 
other words, conceptual equivalence is assumed.  Conceptual equivalence means Western 
developed meanings of concepts are similarly or equally understood and conceived in all 
cultures, regardless of their discrete socio-historical contexts. 
 
Psychologically, a concept is “a mental category we use to classify events, objects, situations, 




(Matsumoto, 1996, p.141).  Concepts are thus formed in people’s minds to help them receive and 
evaluate information to enable them to make informed decisions and act appropriately 
(Matsumoto, 1996).  Concept formation is stimulated by how an individual perceives the self, 
others and the environment that he or she is constantly in contact with.  This may differ 
depending on the social, historical and cultural factors at play in different contexts (Matsumoto, 
1996).  This is one of the reasons why research findings of studies conducted under different 
epistemologies should not be generalised to other contexts.  Cross-cultural studies in moral 
reasoning (Mkhize, 2006; Simpson, 1974; Verhoef & Michel, 1997), emotions (Matsumoto, 
1996), intelligence (Kwate, 2001), to mention but a few, have been found to be neither 
meaningful nor informative, especially because of different languages which also entail different 
conceptions of symbols and concepts. 
 
Expanding on the intelligence example, Kwate (2001) critically evaluated the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children – Third Edition (WISC-III), an intelligence test used all over the 
world to test the intelligence of children between the ages of 6 and 16 years.  He found many 
problems with this test when it was applied to African children; the test does not test African 
children’s capabilities of surviving and thriving in their own environment (Kwate, 2001).  This 
occurs because most intelligence or cognitive tests, the WISC-III being no exception, lack 
cultural, conceptual, linguistic and educational equivalence, dismiss other ways of knowing or 
epistemologies and are mostly developed with the Western definition of relationships between 
humans and nature in mind and appreciate logical reasoning (Kwate, 2001).  The WISC-III was 
standardised using Western norms and values and these were taken to be universally applicable 
to all children because of the superimposition of Western culture and epistemology.  
 
Thus, cross-cultural studies have first to demonstrate that the groups being compared define or 
understand the task at hand similarly.  Language plays a major role here.  A task initially 
developed for one group cannot be assumed to be applicable to another until conceptual 




investigate how researchers and community members, including CABs, conceptualise what 
constitutes an ethical dilemma, with reference to autonomy and relatedness.  Conceptual 
equivalence is not always guaranteed, especially in cross-cultural research, as has been discussed 
above.  Thus, concept formulation may not be equivalent between cultures or the meaning of 
some cultural concepts may not be equally or similarly understood.  This is especially 
problematic in cross-cultural studies, which assume conceptual equivalence, because people’s 
mental representations of their cultures vary, rather drastically in some instances. 
 
Further, differences in understanding and concomitant problems could arise not only from 
conceptual inequivalence but also from varying definitions of the task at hand, assumptions 
brought to bear to the situation, cultural variability in the theory of mind as well as notions of the 
nature of knowledge (epistemologies), including understanding of the relationship between the 
researcher and the researched (Bruner, 1990; Greenfield, 1997; Goodwin; 2002; Serpell, 1993).  
Often, these assumptions and definitions are not shared openly during the research process, until 
a problem is encountered.  While there has been a reasonable effort to engage with problems 
arising from conceptual inequivalence in obtaining informed consent, minimal attention has been 
directed at understanding what different parties consider to be ethically problematic in any given 
conflictual research scenario, nor have the possible influences of different philosophic 
assumptions been seriously considered.  This lack of consideration of other cultural philosophies 
occurs because mainstream Western approaches to ethics, morality and self, which could be 
dated back to theorists such as Kant and Rawls, and further developed by theorists such as Piaget 
and Kohlberg, assume that ethical principles are universal (Benhabib, 1992; Matsumoto, 1996; 
Monroe, 2001; Simpson, 1974).  This means that ethical principles are deemed true for all people 
regardless of their cultural backgrounds and identities (Matsumoto, 1996; Monroe, 2001). 
 
2.4.2. Implications of the independent view of the self for ethical decision-making 
Triandis (1989) argues that decision-making processes are discrete in different cultural contexts.  




of decision-making.  This means that “judgments and actions are based on information about the 
situation and our ordinary moral sense” (Kitchener, 2000, p.11).  Decision-making occurs when 
current and up-to-date information is available to the person making the decision, so that the 
decision is well informed and rational (Sales & Lavin, 2000).  When one has to make an ethical 
decision, one needs to consult the ethical principles that are mentioned above as they provide 
guidance for ethical conduct (Cottone & Tarvydas, 2007; Kitchener, 2000; Sales & Lavin, 2000).  
Ethical codes and principles will give a framework or uniform standards enabling researchers to 
deal with particular ethical problems and allowing for defendable decisions to be made (Cottone 
& Tarvydas, 2007; Sales & Lavin, 2000).  
 
The independent view of the self reflects Western worldviews.  This is the view of the self that 
associates itself with labels such as autonomous, separate, egocentric, to mention but a few 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  Cultural competence is achieved when individuals are able to refer 
to internally-held principles, thoughts, emotions and behaviour (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 
Mkhize, 2004).  The implication of this on decision-making is that decisions are made with 
reference to internally-held, universal principles, and are individually legislated (Benhabib, 
1992; Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize, 2004; Prinsloo, 1998; Simpson, 1974).  This happens because 
individuals are believed to be atomistic, separate, individualistic and capable of engaging in 
ethical decision-making processes on their own, without the influence of significant others 
(Mkhize, 2004).  Thus, decision-making is rational and individualised; individuals decide with 
“reference to [their] own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and actions” (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991, p.226).  It is imperative for researchers to obtain informed consent before 
embarking on any research study and the independent construal of the self endorses and 
encourages individuals to make decisions independently of others.  The concept of informed 
consent is discussed below as an example of the implications the independent construal of the 
self has on decision-making, specifically for individuals affiliated to the Western epistemology 





2.4.2.1. Informed consent 
Informed consent is the process by which researchers seek “explicit and uncoerced agreement 
from subjects to participate in a research project, based on their full understanding of the 
procedures involved and their likely effects” (Terre Blanche, Kelly & Durrheim, 2006, p.560).  It 
was introduced by the Declaration of Helsinki, an international guideline for research, as a 
central requirement for any research conducted (Coughlin & Beauchamp, 1995; Marshall & 
Koenig, 2004).  This international guideline is largely influenced by the Western conception of 
the self.  It thus values individual autonomy when embarking on decision-making processes 
(Marshall & Koenig, 2004).  Kuczewski and McCruden (2001) support this view, arguing that 
“the very concept of autonomy is a product of our Western culture, which values individual 
freedom and self-determination” (p.34).  
 
The usual process of obtaining informed consent involves asking participants to independently 
read and sign a consent form if they agree to participate in the research study (Doumbo, 2005).  
No outside influence is required as the choice of partaking or not lies solely with the individual.  
This approach carries an implicit assumption that all human subjects are literate or have the 
ability to read and write and can therefore, clearly understand what the research study is about 
(Doumbo, 2005).  It thus proves difficult to gain informed consent following the international, 
Western guidelines in developing and underdeveloped countries where the population cannot 
read or write or where social structures are different from those of the West (Doumbo, 2005; 
Muller, 1994).  Beauchamp and Walters (1989) argue that illiteracy should not be confused with 
a lack of intelligence, because that has often been the concluding findings of some cross-cultural 
research done, especially on intelligence, an example discussed above.   
 
Obtaining informed consent is complicated if the researcher is working with people from non-
Western cultures, owing to different conceptions of personhood, among other factors (Doumbo, 
2005).  Participants should consent to research only if they understand the subject matter of the 




1995).  Thus, autonomy and informed consent, which are essential prerequisites of the research 
process, might present difficulties in cultures where personal choice is limited or not regarded as 
important as affiliation to one’s cultural group or community (Barry, 1988; Doumbo, 2005, 
Ikuenobe, 1998).  Sharp and Foster (2002) argue that “existing regulatory policies and ethical 
guidelines concentrate on immediate risks to individual study participants and do not require 
researchers or ethics review boards to consider potential harm to non-participants” (p,146). 
 
2.4.2.2. Ethical principles and Universalism   
Universal principles in ethics assume that ethical principles are “true for all people of all 
cultures” (Matsumoto, 1996, p.5).  This belief originates mainly from theorists such as Hume, 
Hobbes and Kant, who philosophised that the underlying human building blocks or human nature 
is fundamentally the same (Benhabib, 2002; Monroe, 2001).  Kant proceeded to conjecture that 
human beings are thus capable of formulating and able to live by “universalizable moral 
principles” (Benhabib, 2002, p.26).  Thus the idea of universalism would infer that people, 
regardless of gender, race, ethnic background, cultural background, etc would be considered 
moral equals and should consider ethical issues in similar ways and, if not, then that person or 
those persons are considered to be morally or intellectually inferior.  Markus and Kitayama 
(2003) argued this generalisation of universalism was “a sign of commitment to science, and the 
goal of science was to pursue the universal laws of human nature” (p.280). 
 
This idea of universality in ethics is thus in contrast with the view that ethics and the 
development of the self are culture-specific, meaning that an ethical self develops within a 
specific cultural tradition (Ermine et al., 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Matsumoto, 
1996, 2006; Mkhize, 2004; Triandis, 1989).  Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued that the view 
of the self and hence the development of morality and ethics, which is deemed universal, is 
actually quite specific to some subdivisions of Western culture.  This assumes cultural 
relativism.  Cultural relativism is a school of thought which states that there is more than one 




Pack-Brown & Williams, 2003).  Cultural relativism developed partly as a critique to 
universalism and seeks to “identify human cultures not as local variations on a basically 
universal nature, but as self-contained, unique and organic entities” (Monroe, 2001, p.503).  
 
There were numerous major universalist theorists, whose conclusions from their research studies 
were generalised to other cultures because they believed in the universalistic paradigm.  
Kohlberg (1978) is an example.  Following Piaget, Kohlberg concluded that core practices, such 
as culture, are insignificant and are nuisance variables in the development of an individual’s 
moral standards (Gilligan, 1977; Simpson, 1974).  This view has been widely criticised by 
African and some Western and non-Western scholars, such as Barry, 1988; Gbadegesin, 1993; 
Karenga, 2004; Kigongo, n.d.; Mbiti, 1970; Mkhize, 2003, 2004, 2006; Muller, 1994; 
Ogbonnaya, 1994; Okolo, 2002; Prozesky, n.d.; Simpson, 1974.  These theorists commonly 
argue that culture is not just a nuisance variable but an integral part of an individual’s moral 
development as it holds a “set of control mechanisms – plans, recipes, rules, instructions – for 
governing behaviour” (Geertz, 1975, as cited in Gilbert, 1989, p.95). 
 
Universalism has been criticised because each and every society is said to have “certain 
regulations and norms that govern human behaviour, inter-human relationships, and relationship 
with the environment and the supernatural world” (Prozesky, n.d.).  If this speaks the truth of 
ethics, then ethics cannot be uproblematically generalised or applied to all human beings 
irrespective of their cultural backgrounds.  This is because ethics are closely related to the 
concept of culture as human beings live according to the values, belief systems and ways of life 
which are abstracted from their unique and self-contained cultural tradition (Benhabib, 2002; 
Ermine et al., 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Monroe, 2001; Prozesky, n.d.; Shweder, 1990). 
Also, this attempt to dissolve culture and all that it entails into the abstracts of universalism is to 
deny the differences that undeniably exist between the researcher and the research participants, 






The assumption of universalism in ethics may be one of the sources of ethical challenges in 
research. This is because, assuming universalism in ethics implies an automatic denial of the vast 
differences that exist between and within cultural beings evident in the fast growing literature on 
culture and cultured relativism (Matsumoto, 1996, 2006; Monroe, 2001).  Assumptions of 
universalism may also result in the researcher failing to realise the limitations of his or her study 
to a particular context and aim at generalising or applying his or her research findings to groups 
of people for which they may not be applicable (Matsumoto, 1996).  This may occur due to a 
failure to take the dynamic interdependence between mind, behaviour and culture into 
consideration, meaning that the research findings are “considered to be true for some people of 
some culture but not for others” (Matsumoto, 1996, p.9).  This ignorance sometimes comes with 
the researchers as they assume the role of the more knowledgeable other or as experts of the 
people being studied, thus thinking that their knowledge makes them superior than the people 
being studied.  The researcher is however aware of the challenges of extreme relativism which 
will result in nihilism and non-action.  It is beyond the scope of this study to engage the tensions 
between relativism and universalism and how they can be breached.  The study limits itself to an 
exposition of alternative moral and ethical decision-frameworks, in line with Brodwin’s (2001) 
call for the study of competing ethical systems.  
 
2.5. African conception of the self: Communal Self 
In this section of the thesis, an African conception of the self is discussed.  It provides another 
way of looking at the self that is different from the dominant view of the West.  The cosmology 
of the communal view of the self is associated with terms such as ‘interdependent’, ‘relational’, 
‘holistic’, ‘communitarian’, ‘interconnected’ ‘humanism’ and ‘collectivism’ (Bujo, 2001; 
Doumbo, 2005; Gambu, 2000; Gbadegesin, 1998; Gyekye, 1998; Grills, 2004; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Matsumoto, 1996, 2003; Mkhize, 2004; Kambon, 1998; Palmer & 
Laungani, 1999; Prinsloo; 1998; Triandis, 1989; Wiredu, 1998).  This communal or collective 
worldview of the self is the reality in African and non-Western indigenous cultures and to some 




self “defines the self in relation to others” (Gambu, 2000, p.8).  In this worldview, a human being 
is not defined with reference to abstract psychological attributes as in the Western worldview 
discussed above.  Instead, people are defined in terms of their relationships with significant 
others with whom they are in constant contact with (Gyekye, 1998; Matsumoto, 1996; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Mkhize, 2004; Triandis, 1989; Wiredu, 1998).  This occurs because of 
the interdependence that exists “between individuals and the community, [and hence] 
personhood cannot be defined solely in terms of physical and psychological attributes” (Mkhize, 
2004, p.47). 
 
This worldview of the self fosters the development of an interdependent rather than the 
independent construal of self.  The interdependent construal of the self involves a person 
perceiving him- or herself “as part of an encompassing social relationship and recognizing that 
one’s behavior is determined, contingent on, and, to a large extent organized by what the actor 
perceives to be the thoughts, feelings and actions of others in the relationship” (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991, p.227).  In this construal of the self, the person’s status and position in relation 
to the larger social unit is seen to be of great importance because it gives people a sense of where 
they are and their roles in the differing relationships (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Mkhize; 2004).  
This brings a sense of meaning, purpose and completeness into the person’s life (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991).  Hence the individual exists in and for the community; personhood is made 
possible by the societal norms and values that are in place to create social harmony (Mkhize, 
2004; Nsamenang, 1999).  Thus, this conception of self, also known as the interdependent 
construal of self, sees the self as “unbounded, flexible, and contingent on context” (Matsumoto, 
1996, p.40).   
 
Ellis (1978, cited in Mboya, 1999) states that in African thought “a man is not a man on his own, 
the individual gains significance from and through his [her] relationships with others” (p.29).  
Therefore, in the African context, an individual is socialised to assume a “social responsibility 




associate and fit in with others and share responsibilities rather than standing out or separate 
from others (Ermine et al., 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize, 
2004; Nsamenang, 1999).  Wiredu (1998) further argued that the communalist orientation of the 
self prizes harmony.  Therefore the goal in this context is to “harmonize one’s interests with 
those of the collective” (Mkhize, 2004, p.27).  This is because others form an integral part of the 
self as they enable the self to develop and achieve the fullness of being within the concrete act of 
relating to others (Benhabib, 1992; Gyekye, 1998; Mkhize, 2004). 
 
The African communitarian approach also takes a concrete view of the self (Barry, 1988; 
Benhabib, 1992; Doumbo, 2005; Karenga, 2004; Kigongo, n.d.; Mkhize, 2004, 2006; 
Ogbonnaya, 1994; Okolo, 2002; Prozesky, n.d.).  The concrete view of the self “requires us to 
view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity and 
affective-emotional constitution” (Benhabib, 1992, p.159).  Benhabib (2002) further argues that 
the concrete Other enables human beings to extrapolate the representations of their similarities 
and pay attention to the differences or individuality in order for the differences to be used in 
complementing rather than excluding each other.  This conception of selfhood assumes the 
“Concrete Other” – that is, the self connected to other selves via concrete relational and historical 
ties – as the point of departure.  Such a self values a socially-negotiated account to decision-
making, whereby meaning emerges from a joint process involving family members and relevant 
community members, where appropriate (Cottone, 2001; Doumbo, 2005; Mkhize, 2006).  
 
The ‘concreteness’ of this worldview further speaks of the contextualisation of the African self. 
Contextualisation is a “cultural dimension that refers to the degree to which cultures foster 
differential behaviors according to the specific context within which those behaviors occur” 
(Matsumoto, 1996, p.32).  African ways of being appreciate behaviour specific to where it 
occurred, thus behaviour and the context where it happened cannot be seen to be separate from 






The African context is communal and spiritual in its nature.  The self is thus realised through 
participation in the community where webs of hierarchical relationships and other spiritual forces 
exist to govern self behaviour in its context (Grills, 2004; Mkhize, 2004).  God is seen as the 
Supreme Being followed by the ancestors or the living-dead.  The ancestors are people that have 
died and transited to another spiritual world in a hierarchy above those presently living and those 
yet to be born.  At this point it is important to note that not everybody that dies becomes an 
ancestor.  The belief for African people is that those that have previously occupied this earth and 
“lived a life characterized by high moral standards can be elevated to the status of an inyanya” 
(Mkhize, 2004, p.41).  Inyanya or idlozi are isiZulu words meaning ancestor.  The elevation of 
one to an ancestor or idlozi depends a lot on how one lived his life on earth (Mkhize, 2004).  For 
example, people who lived a morally sound and ethical life, once dead and a transition ritual has 
been done, those people are then considered to be superior beings working as God’s agents in 
different capacities, to restore and maintain the good health of their families and communities at 
large.  They are able to make the unknown known, because as much as the ancestors occupy 
space in the universe, they are “believed to be invisible to the naked eye and inaudible to the 
normal ear, except when maybe they choose to manifest themselves to a particular person for a 
special reason” (Wiredu, 1996, p.53, original emphasis).  
 
On the meaning of community: in African moral metaphysics, a human being is not defined with 
reference to abstract psychological attributes; rather, a person is his or her “practice-in-
relationships” (Karenga, 2004, p.254, emphasis original).  As Menkiti (1984), Mkhize (2004) 
and Ogbonnaya (1994) have argued, personhood in African moral metaphysics is defined with 
reference to an experiential moral community.  The term community, in this instance, is not 
defined in mere geographic terms; it captures the organic relationship between individuals, their 
social relations and practices towards one another.  In this type of community, defined by 
Karenga (2004) as a “participatory moral community” (p.257) , the “person-in-relationship, i.e. 
in family, community, society, is the center of focus as distinct from modern European 




focus and center of gravity” (ibid, p.257).  Thus, ‘community’ is defined by people’s awareness 
of their mutual obligations and responsibilities towards one another and that is related to the 
principle of ubuntu.  
 
However, the idea of selves that emerge, in a way, through participation in a human community, 
is widely contested by theorists who believe in the principle of absolute autonomy, à la Hobbes’s 
state of nature metaphor (Benhabib, 1992).  They argue that if personhood is tied to relations 
with others, then the person’s autonomous self-definition is restricted to the social relations in 
which he or she finds him/herself (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2003).  The socio-
cultural school of thought, on the other hand, counters that a dialogic relationship between 
persons and others fosters learning through participation in the activities of one’s culture or 
interpretive community (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2003). 
 
2.5.1. Implications of the interdependent view of the self on decision-making  
The communal view of the self, described above, leads to a different approach to ethics and 
ethical decision-making.  This implies that the ethical theories being applied as a universal guide 
to the resolution of ethical dilemmas, like principlism, are not sufficient.  The ethical theory of 
ubuntu will be discussed below as a logical consequence of the communal self.  Ubuntu prizes 
collective and communal decision-making in order to generate mutual understanding of the 
issues at hand and this is called the joint process (Cottone, 2001; Doumbo, 2005).  This decision-
making model will form the second part of this section of the implications of the interdependent 
self to ethical decision-making.  The last section will focus on ways of knowing inherent in the 





2.5.2. The Ethic of Ubuntu 
The ethics of ubuntu is associated with the view that a human being is closely connected to 
fellow human beings.  It has similarities with ethical theories such as virtue ethics, feminist 
ethics and the ethics of care (Cottone & Tarvydas, 2007).  The latter is the one that is closely 
linked to the discussions of the chapter.  Relational ethics deal with “ethical reasoning primarily 
through development of character traits or virtues and concerns itself with cultural, contextual, 
relational and emotional-intuitive responses to ethical dilemmas” (Cottone & Tarvydas, 2007, 
p.80).   
 
According to Prozesky (n.d.), the idea of ubuntu “underpins the very communal nature of 
African society and by extension its ethics” (p.4), and derives from this an understanding of 
personhood.  However, ubuntu is not a rejection of individuality or respect for persons.  That is, 
the fact that a society values communal practices does not mean there is no sense of personhood 
or respect for the individuality of persons (Nze, 1989, as cited in Okolo, 2002).  Instead, it is the 
idea of individuality in the modern European sense, of persons as isolated, unencumbered and 
ultimately alone, that is rejected.  Indeed, ubuntu incorporates the idea of social justice, caring 
and compassion for others, and respect for the individuality and humanity of the Other, who is 
different from us (Mkhize, 2004).  This also includes the whole cosmology of African people’s 
reality, that is, including the people that have died and the people yet to be born, because “a bad 
deed affects all systems not just the individual” (Bujo, 2001, p.2).  
 
Chikanda (1990, as cited in Prinsloo, 1998) is in agreement with the above, stating that ubuntu is 
‘African Humanism’, which “involves sympathy, care, sensitivity to the needs of others, respect, 
consideration, patience and kindness” (p.42). Makhudu (1993, as cited in Prinsloo, 1998) also 
sees traits such as empathy, understanding, warmth, participation, interaction, cooperation, 
harmony, sharing, reciprocation and a shared frame of reference to collectively make up the 
culture of ubuntu.  The collective culture of ubuntu suggests that in any kind of social gathering, 




individual’s rights, as has been argued in some Western literature, because the individual is still 
aware of himself or herself in terms of “I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am” 
(Mbiti, 1970, p.279). 
 
Ramose (1998) refers to ubuntu as the “generalized existence of African people” (p.325).  This is 
because this concept of ubuntu involves a process whereby people are continually behaving in 
such a manner that they are investigating their being, life experiences and the knowledge and 
truth about their lives (Ramose, 1998).  Inquiry into who one is, is a never ending process for 
African people, as one’s identity and becoming is marked by significant milestones in life, as 
evidenced by the different ceremonies performed at various stages of a person’s life.  This 
implies that ubuntu is a process that is always in motion (Ramose, 1998).  Ramose (1998) also 
said that the first principle he associates the ubuntu ethics with is “freedom from dogmatism ... 
orientated towards balance and harmony in the relationships between human beings and between 
the latter and the broader being or nature” (p.326).  
 
The principle of ubuntu is manifest and finds meaning in a number of African languages.  It is 
captured in idioms and sayings, such as ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ in isiZulu, ‘Motho ke 
motho ka batho babang’ (Sotho), ‘hunhu’ (Shona) and ‘abantu balamu’ (good humanness) 
(Kiganda).  These idioms roughly translate “I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I 
am” (Mkhize, 2004, p.47).  This emphasises the interconnectedness in which relationships and 
the conception of personhood are conceived in African cultures.  Given the paucity of terms 
referring to individuals as abstract, autonomous subjects in most African societies, the universal 
grounding of ethics on this notion of the self is questionable.  Ramose (1998) further argued that 
to “dissolve the specificity of ubuntu into abstract ‘universality’ is to deny its right to be 
different” (p.327).  This dissolving of ubuntu has been attempted by Western scholars because 
they have a limited understanding of it.  However, this has not stopped them from critically 





2.5.3. Decision-making Model: Communal 
The communal conception of the self prizes ubuntu ethics: life decisions are made in relation to 
significant others, be it one’s family and, in some instances, the community (Bujo, 2001; Grills, 
2004; Mkhize, 2004).  This signifies a culture of consultation that the ethical principle of ubuntu 
incorporates when decisions have to be made (Prinsloo, 1998).  The consultation process is 
planned strategically and only selective members of the family and community can be consulted.  
Those that are most often consulted are the elders of the family or community and they are given 
more power in the decision-making process.  Elders bring their life experience, wisdom and 
knowledge to the decision-making process (Prinsloo, 1998). 
  
The communal view of the self also values the socially-negotiated account to decision-making.  
This is whereby meaning emerges from a joint process, whereby family members and relevant 
community members are involved in decision-making, where appropriate (Cottone, 2001; 
Doumbo, 2005; Mkhize, 2006).  This is known as ibandla or inkundla in isiZulu (roughly, a 
gathering with a view to discuss issues and to reach consensus).  For example, Doumbo (2005) 
embarked on this process of decision-making for his medical study of Malaria in Mali.  He and 
his colleagues held meetings starting with the elders of the community to the various heads of 
extended families, then proceeded to have meetings with the mothers of the children he wanted 
in the study and lastly, they obtained individual consent (assent) from those children.  From this 
perspective, therefore, ethical decision-making could be considered as joint action (Shotter, 
1984, 1993a, 1993b).  The joint action approach implies that “the theorist shifts attention away 
from the single individual; the central units of understanding become social collaborations or 
relational forms” (Gergen, 1990; as cited by Shotter, 1993a, p.60).  This helps build more trust 
and confidence in the research process because all people in the area will be aware of the 
researchers and their intentions as they come in (Doumbo, 2005).  It also promotes active 
collaboration in decision-making within the family and the community at large (Crawford & 
Lipsedge, 2004).  Crawford and Lipsedge (2004) further say that this active communal 
collaboration helps to strengthen “existing social ties and increase and increase the family’s 






Western and African/Non-western groups’ differing conceptions of selfhood and their 
participation in various interpretive communities or background horizons of understanding 
(Gadamer, 1975) could have a bearing not only on their conceptions of ethical dilemmas but also 
on their understanding of how such dilemmas ought to be resolved.  Tensions and contradictions 
arising from differences in horizons of understanding are also explored.  The idea is to show, as 
others have argued, that a truly ethical stance is not to be found in abstract principles per se, but 
that it should involve willingness to listen to others’ perspectives (Tshudin, 2006) and, where 
indicated, the willingness to be changed by the perspective of the Other (Gadamer, 1975).  Thus, 
the purpose of this research is not to substitute one ethical system for another: today’s societies 
are complex enough to contain multiple ethical systems (Brodwin, 2001).  Following Brodwin’s 
recommendations, as well as the works of Izumi (2006) in China, the research aims to identify 
local ethical systems at play in any given research situation as well as their interface with 





CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents the methodology used to gather and analyse data.  It begins with the design 
of the study.  Sampling is then discussed, followed by a description of the data collection process 
and the procedure that the interviewer used in collecting the data.  Following this is a section on 
data analysis.  Finally, design reliability and validity are discussed, followed by the ethical 
considerations. 
 
3.1. Design  
Given the purpose of this study, which is concerned with meaning making, a qualitative research 
design was employed.  The study design was conceptualised during the initial phases in order to 
maximise coherence between the purpose of the study, the context, the research question and 
other research issues (Gambu, 2000; Maxwell, 1998; McNeill & Chapman, 2005).  While the 
design was conceptualised from the beginning, it was not fixed as it had to take into 
consideration not only the issues emerging during the study but also the socio-historical context 
of the participants (Silverman, 2005).  Lincoln and Guba (1985, as cited by Stake, 1985) concur 
with this; they state that “qualitative research is based on holistic view that social phenomena, 
human dilemmas and the nature of cases are situational and influenced by happenings of many 
kinds” (p.440).  
 
The qualitative design allowed for rich and more informative data to be collected in the 
participants’ context and situational boundaries (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994; Marshall & 
Roosman, 1989; Silverman, 2005).  Data were collected in the natural setting of the research 
participants, where the researcher was able to interact informally with them and thereby 
developing not only a trusting relationship but also a better sense of the context within which the 
data were collected (Cresswell, 1998; Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994; Terre Blanche et al., 2006).  




contexts and not to “appear as an invisible voice of authority, but as a real historical individual 
with concrete specific desires and interests” (Mkabela, 2005, p.180).  To give a practical 
example, when the researcher of this study had to attended several meetings and traditional 
ceremonies with a group of traditional healers in one of the local communities, i.e. in their 
natural setting, she dressed appropriately and in a way that showed she had an understanding of 
the social context in which they found themselves and respect for their cultural values and 
norms.  This was critical in gaining the participants’ trust and hence their positive response to the 
study.   
 
The qualitative research design was appropriate for this study because it allowed for in-depth 
narratives of the different stakeholders with regards to their definitions of what constitutes an 
ethical dilemma and thus explored how they engage in ethical decision-making.  Decision-
making is an everyday occurrence for all people and therefore informs people’s everyday 
behaviour.  Silverman (2005) argues that if one’s research study attempts to answer questions 
about people’s everyday lives, a qualitative research design is most appropriate.  In the current 
study, the flexibility of the design allowed for in-depth probing/questioning and clarifications 
where it was needed (Silverman, 2005).  This flexibility further allowed for the sampling of 
research participants to be guided by the “increasingly refined research questions” (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1989, p.26). 
 
3.2. Sampling  
The study used non-probability, purposeful sampling, as the purpose of the study was not to 
make statistical generalisations but to find information-rich cases to be studied in depth 
(Dawson, 2007; Kerlinger, 1986; Maxwell, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2001).  
Purposive sampling is “characterized by the use of judgment and deliberation effort to obtain 
representative samples by including presumably typical areas or groups in the sample” 
(Kerlinger, 1986, p.120).  The deliberation effort involves the researcher thinking critically about 




(Silverman, 2005).  This is the basic assumption of purposive sampling: participants are 
strategically selected or handpicked, depending on the purposes of the study (Dawson, 2007; 
McNeill & Chapman, 2005). 
 
Snowball and maximum variation sampling (Maxwell, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994) were 
also used to identify other participants whose participation added depth to the study.  Snowball 
sampling “involves identifying certain key individuals in a population, interviewing them, and 
then asking them to suggest others who might be interviewed” (McNeill & Chapman, 2005, 
p.50).  One of the key individuals in this study, a male nurse who is also a traditional healer, was 
able to link the researcher with a number of community members and a community 
representative (traditional healers) who took part in this study.  The sampling also aimed at 
selecting contrasting cases (e.g. community members who have participated in research versus 
those who have not participated) in order to test the robustness of the findings.  Maximum 
variation sampling was most useful here; it allowed for this contrasting to occur (Maxwell, 1998; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994).  In line with maximum variation sampling, the researcher made an 
effort to sample across factors such as gender, age, education, occupation, research experience 
(for researchers) and socio-economic status.  These factors were not used as independent 
variables in the traditional, experimental sense: the purpose was to gain insight into how the 
socio-cultural positionality (cf. Alcoff, 1988) of the research participants and the positions they 
occupy in society, possibly influence the way they reason about ethical dilemmas.  
 
Three groups of participants were targeted in this study: researchers, community representatives 
and members of the community who have participated in social science or health-related 
research (and, for contrasting purposes, community members who have not participated in 
research).  Two researchers were sampled from the local university community and one from a 
major social science research organisation in the region.  Participation in community, social 





Community members were sampled from two neighbouring communities in the KwaZulu-Natal 
Midlands.  Two communities were strategically sampled for two reasons. Firstly, the researcher 
was likely to find community members who had participated in research in one of the 
communities, given its established association with research institutions.  Secondly, the 
researcher had access to a key contact who was able to facilitate access to this community.  
Through this contact, who was also interviewed as a community advisory board member, the 
researcher was able to link up with a second community advisory board member.  This meant 
that two advisory board members were interviewed.  Four interviewees were community 
members, two of whom had previously participated in research studies, while the remaining two 
had never partaken in research.  
 
Altogether, nine participants took part in the study, (Table 1 below).  This number was not fixed 
in advance, as the purpose was not to develop sample statistics that approximate population 
parameters.  The nine participants exclude the one interview that was done as a pilot for the 
study.  This pilot interview was significant as it pointed to some factors that needed to be 
attended to before the main interviews were conducted.  The pilot interview was done with a 
field researcher connected to one of the health-related research institutions.  This interviewee 
was isiZulu-speaking, and so the interview was conducted in isiZulu using the scenarios and the 
interview schedules that had been translated from English to isiZulu.  Amongst other things, the 
pilot interview allowed the researcher to check for consistency between the isiZulu and English 
versions of the scenarios.  There were one or two questions that had to be re-worked in the 
isiZulu version of the interview schedule as they were more comprehensive.  A considerable 
amount of time was allocated to this process of creating and translating the ethical scenarios and 






















3 2 2 2 
Table 1: Number of research participants by category 
 
3.3. Data Collection Technique  
A hypothetical ethical scenario mirroring real life circumstances (Appendix A) was developed to 
serve as a stimulus leading to the discussion of ethical issues.  The scenario involved a moral 
agent who had to resolve an ethical dilemma (e.g. a dilemma between making decisions as an 
individual versus deciding with reference to a collective).  Participants were presented with this 
dilemma, followed by a number of probing questions.  Each question was meant to elicit a 
particular dimension of ethical experience, such as autonomy, relatedness, and ideas about the 
ownership of knowledge.  
 
The method of hypothetical dilemmas, pioneered by Lawrence Kohlberg in the study of moral 
reasoning (e.g. Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a, 1987b; Kohlberg, 1984), continues to be used in its 
various forms to study moral and ethical decision-making in various cultural contexts (e.g. 
Tschudin, 2006).  While the researcher could be criticised for relying on hypothetical as opposed 
to real life ethical dilemmas, she is of the view that the dilemmas captured in the ethical 
scenarios, which have been developed/adapted from the research and clinical ethics literature 
(e.g. Gbadegesin, 1993; Bebeau, Pimple, Muskavitch, Borden & Smith, 1995), generally 




participants were asked to relate how the dilemmas in question related to their own experiences.  
The ethical scenario was available in both isiZulu and English.    
 
3.4. Procedure 
Data were collected by means of individual interviews.  They allowed for an in-depth 
exploration of the issues in question (Kvale, 1996; Kitzinger, 1995).  These were semi-structured 
interviews characterised by open-ended questions that inquired from the research subjects their 
opinion about what was happening in the scenario (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).  For example, 
Question One was: “What do you think is a problem here and how can it be resolved?” The 
research participant answered the questions according to what he or she thought was right or 
wrong and thus offered a solution according to his or her own frame of reference.  There was a 
standardised interview schedule that the interviewer used for all interviews.  As the interview 
schedule was semi-structured, it allowed for follow-up questioning depending on each research 
participant’s responses (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).  
 
This process also enabled the interviewer to play an active role; she did not merely interact 
neutrally by way of asking questions in a passive manner, as this is not possible in qualitative 
research.  Rather, the researcher interacted as a person who is also bound by her own history and 
culture, thus carrying unavoidable conscious motives, desires, feelings and biases making her 
hardly a neutral interviewer (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).  This is very important to note because 
the interviewer is human and has a vested interest in the outcome of the study.  When a 
researcher designs a study, he or she has certain motives and desires driving him or her to 
research the particular issue.  Denzin and Lincoln (2005) also argued that the “interviewer 
becomes an advocate and partner in the study, hoping to be able to use the results to advocate 
social policies” (p.696).  This research study forms part of the emerging literature on African 





While it had been envisaged that interviews would last for about 90–120 minutes, some went 
beyond this time frame; permission was sought from the interviewees to continue for an extra 30 
minutes or more.  The situations and contexts in which the interviews were conducted differed as 
the researcher interviewed participants in their locale.  All the nine interviews were done by the 
same interviewer and this helped in terms of the free flowing of the interviews as the interviewer 
was familiar with the scenario and the interview schedule (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).  Permission 
to tape-record each interview was sought from each participant before the interview started. 
 
Interviews were conducted in isiZulu and English.  In some cases the participants were happy to 
code-switch between isiZulu and English and this was welcomed by the interviewer.  The usage 
of either of the languages depended on the language preferences of the interviewees.  Wherever 
possible, data were transcribed within two days of collection, so as to allow the researcher to 
supplement the data with process notes collected during the interview, which included the 
interviewer’s observation of the interviewee’s body language and gestures made (cf. Miles & 
Huberman, 1994).  The researcher transcribed the data herself and this helped to familiarise 
herself with the data at each stage of the research process.  
 
3.5. Analysis 
Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend that data analysis should start as early as possible to 
assist the researcher to “cycle back and forth between thinking about the existing data and 
generating strategies for collecting new, often better data” (p.50).  This allowed the researcher to 
test new hypotheses that emerged during the analysis stages.  Thus, data analysis in this study 
was an ongoing process.  It started as soon as the interview was finished and the transcribing 
process began.  As mentioned above, all the interviews were conducted by the researcher in 
addition to the transcribing and translation.  This helped the researcher familiarise herself with 





Thematic analysis was used in this research because it is flexible (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
Thematic analysis is a “method for identifying, analyzing and reporting [themes] within data” 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.79).  Data were transformed into findings following Boyatzis’s (1998) 
thematic approach and also the approach advocated by Braun and Clarke (2006).  These two 
approaches were selected out of the many approaches to thematic analysis not only because of 
their similarity but also because they spell out simple and understandable guidelines to transform 
data into findings.  This proved useful for the researcher, a novice in the qualitative research field 
(Cf. Braun & Clarke, 2006).  Initially, the thematic analysis proved to be a difficult task.  The 
researcher had volumes of raw data which she had to sift through.  Braun and Clarke (2006) 
argued that the theoretical freedom of thematic analysis “provides a flexible and useful research 
tool, which can potentially provide a rich and detailed, yet complex, account of data” (p,78).  
This was exactly the experience of the researcher in this study.  
 
The richness and complexity of the data was overwhelming and exciting at the same time.  It felt 
as though the possibilities with the data at hand were endless and it meant that the researcher had 
a chance to apply her own epistemological understanding and assumptions to the data, thus 
playing a very active part in the process of analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  Braun and Clarke 
(2006) provide six phases into the process of thematic analysis and these were very helpful.  The 
first phase involved reading the raw data over and over again until the researcher felt consumed 
by it.  This was done in an endeavour to become familiar with the raw data (Braun & Clarke, 
2006).  Time consuming as the process was, it was facilitated by the fact that the researcher had 
been involved in all stages of data collection and transcription.  The data were actively read to 
identify recurring patterns or ideas.   
 
The second phase involved the production of a first list of ideas that stood out or were interesting 
enough to be taken notice of and from which to derive more meaning (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
This was the beginning of the ‘coding’ process where “a list of themes; a complex model with 




two forms” (Boyatzis, 1998, p.4) was generated.  This process of coding was helpful in 
organising the complex data at hand into meaningful chunks and this made the data less 
overwhelming.  The coding process was done separately for the three groups of stakeholders in 
this research.  When the data was coded and organised, the researcher began looking for 
overarching themes and supporting extracts for those themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006).   
 
Braun and Clarke (2006) explain that a “theme captures something important about the data in 
relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning 
within the data set” (p,82, original emphasis).  Themes were developed inductively, from the raw 
data itself, meaning that the themes that were identified and selected were strongly linked to the 
data (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006).  They were also deductively identified with 
reference to theory or previous research (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006).  The researcher 
was looking for patterned responses related to the research questions.  Mind maps were a useful 
tool at this stage of the research and four main mind maps were compiled.  These were for the 
group of researchers, community advisory board members, community members previously 
involved in research and lastly, community members previously not involved in research.  Once 
these four mind maps were generated for the different groups of participants, the researcher had 
to try and source meaning from each of them.  This in turn led to a bigger mind map where main 
themes from all four mind maps were systematically organised.  This was yet another complex 
and lengthy process in the pursuit of meaning.  This process involved deciding which themes 
were to be the main ones and which were to be sub-themes and why (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
 
At this point the researcher had compiled a number of themes, some of which were a replication 
of others and some for which she could not find extracts that gave a precise illustration of the 
particular main theme.  This called for all the themes to be carefully reviewed which was the 
beginning of phase four (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  This involved collapsing some of the themes 
into one or into sub-themes, discarding some of the themes and creating new themes.  The 




& Clarke, 2006).  This was a challenging process because the themes kept changing according to 
the researcher’s understanding of the data at hand.  The end result of this process was the 
compilation of three main themes, each with its own sub-themes.  These themes were most 
prevalent in the research but the meaning and reasoning behind them sometimes differed 
depending on the positioning of the research participants.  This will become clearer in the 
following chapter.  All of this would not have been possible without the supervising researcher’s 
challenging questions, valuable insights and knowledge and interest in this field of research.  
 
3.6. Design Reliability and Validity 
Positivist accounts of reliability and validity are generally not relevant to qualitative research 
(Janesick, 1994; Marshall & Roosman, 1989; Patton, 1990).  The positivist account infers that 
“social reality is open to outside observations and can be objectively studied rather than being 
constructed by the perceptions and experiences of its members” (Hall & Hall, 1996, p.38).  This 
is a scientific model mostly applicable to quantitative studies because their success is determined 
by proving that their methods measure objective constructs.  Maxwell (1992) and Gambu (2000) 
argue that this approach is not suitable for qualitative studies because reliability and validity do 
not rely on the presence of one encompassing truth upon which all others are compared.  This is 
also because qualitative research acknowledges that researchers are human beings that are 
influenced by their own epistemological and historical contexts which they also bring into the 
process of research (Dawson, 2007). 
 
3.6.1. Reliability  
In the traditional sense, reliability refers to the consistency of a measure being used to always 
come up with the same results regardless of the different users (Dawson, 2007; McNeill & 
Chapman, 2005).  However, according to Miles and Huberman (1994), reliability or 
dependability in qualitative research is concerned with the extent to which the research process 




a clear explication of the process by which observations were treated and turned into findings.  
The current researcher safeguarded reliability firstly by conducting all the interviews and 
transcribing them personally to minimise the possibility of bias arising from inter-interviewer 
differences and transcription inaccuracy.  Secondly, a thorough record of the research process 
was kept.  This involved completing a contact summary information sheet (Appendix C) for each 
participant at the end of each interview, while interviews were recorded and transcribed as soon 
as possible after data collection.  There was no necessity for follow-up interviews as the 
observations were recorded; a satisfactory measure of accuracy was achieved (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1989; Silverman, 2001).   
 
3.6.2. Validity 
Validity refers to the extent to which the data collection techniques truly assess the underlying 
constructs; what the researcher intended to measure (Cook, 2000; Dawson, 2007; Hall & Hall, 
1996).  As has been discussed above, the psychometric approach to validity was not applicable to 
this qualitative study.  Kvale (1995) argues that this is because the psychometric approach 
“belong [s] to some abstract realm in a sanctuary of science, far removed from the interactions of 
the everyday world” (p.19).  Validity as it applied to this study is discussed next. 
 
3.6.2.1. Theoretical Validation and Transferability 
Validity was ascertained with reference to theory (Cook, 2000; Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
Qualitative research does not aim for wide generalisations; rather it aims at establishing 
transferable findings.  Thus, theoretical validation in qualitative research involves the 
development of a theory or theories “that not only make sense of the particular persons or 
situations studied, but [that] also shows how the same process, in different situations, can lead to 
different results” (Maxwell, 1992, p.293).  Theoretical validation in this study was ascertained by 




relatedness, taking into account the tensions between indigenous and Western worldviews as 
spelt out in the literature review.  
 
3.6.2.2. Interpretive Validity 
Finally, interpretive validation was used as another way of validating this study.  This is the 
extent to which the findings make sense from the perspectives of the people whose meaning is in 
question (Maxwell, 1992; Miles & Huberman, 1984).  Thus the context and other socio-historical 
and linguistic issues are recognised to be influential in the process of decision-making.  
Interpretive validity is guaranteed if the researcher has an exceptional understanding of the 
language spoken by the participants, as was the case in this study.  This was assured in this 
research by the ability of the researcher to switch between the two languages in which the 
interviews were conducted, namely English and isuZulu.     
 
3.7. Ethical Considerations 
Informed consent was negotiated explicitly with each research participant to make certain that he 
or she understood the research purpose, process or procedure and his or her role in the study.  
Negotiation of informed consent and the actual interviews were facilitated because they were 
done using the preferred language of the research participants, i.e. English and/or IsiZulu (see 
Appendices E and F).  This was particularly important to avoid assuming conceptual equivalence 
between and within ethnical groups of research participants; concepts such as autonomy are 
value-laden. 
 
Interesting observations were made during the interview process, especially with the traditional 
healers.  Firstly, they were not approached as individuals but as a community of traditional 
healers.  On the day of the interview, they all gathered in one place and took turns being 




explicit that she could visit each of them in their homes or places of work, but they preferred the 
gathering.  Secondly, once all the traditional healers had gathered, the owner of the home burnt 
incense (impepho).  He explained that he was inviting his ancestors to be part of the process and 
introducing the visitors to them.  All those present, including the researcher, had to inhale the 
incense.  This was yet another tradition of the healers that the researcher had to respect.  
Fortunately, she was familiar with the ritual of the burning of incense as her family practises it as 
well.   
 
Confidentiality was assured by not using the participants’ names during the interviews and in the 
transcribed text.  Permission to audio-tape the interview was obtained before data collection.  
The tapes will be kept in a safe place for a period of at least five years as they form an integral 
part of the data.  Furthermore, raw data transcription has only been accessible to the researcher 
and the project supervisor.  The names of individual participants or communities from which the 
data were collected are not revealed in the dissertation or future publications arising from this 
research.  Care was taken to edit out historical incidences that might unwittingly reveal the 
identities of the communities in question.  As far as the research is concerned, participants did 
not incur expenses by virtue of participating in this study: the researcher travelled to the 
communities, organisations and individuals that were interviewed.  There were no immediate 
benefits awarded to the research participants.  This was clearly stated in the consent form to 
which they agreed.  The long-term benefits of the study for the participants were that they were 
contributing to a research study and literature on indigenous ethical decision-making.  
 
Permission for this study was granted by the University of KwaZulu-Natal Faculty Research 






The research seeks to understand how people, namely, researchers, community representatives 
and community members, conceptualise and understand ethical dilemmas and therefore how this 
affects their means of problem solving or ethical decision-making.  The chapter discussed the 
methodology used in this study.  Research design and sampling procedures were discussed, as 
were techniques and approaches used to collect and analyse data.  Lastly, issues of reliability, 
validity and ethical considerations were attended to.  The results and discussion of the study 





CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4. Introduction  
This chapter presents the study findings and discussion.  The findings presented speak to two 
research questions: How do researchers, research participants and community representatives 
(CABs) define what constitutes an ethical dilemma; and, What mechanisms should be put in 
place for ethical decision-making (ethical resolution) for researchers, community representatives 
and community participants?  Participants considered ethical dilemmas in terms of (a) benefit 
sharing, (b) communal and individual ownership of knowledge, and (c) different ways of 
knowing and validating of knowledge, being the three main themes.  The main mechanisms for 
resolving ethical dilemmas are (a) the legalistic versus indigenous dispute resolution processes, 
(b) the Bio-Prospecting Act, and (c) prior agreements.   
 
4.1. Understanding of Ethical Dilemmas 
Ethical dilemmas were considered in terms of (1) benefit sharing, (2) communal versus 
individual ownership of knowledge, and (3) different ways of knowing and validation of 
knowledge.  Each of these conceptions is presented and discussed.  
 
4.1.1. Benefit sharing  
Participants across all categories felt that there were discrepancies or imbalances in the way the 
proceeds or benefits of the research were shared and this constitutes an ethical dilemma.  
Although this theme was shared by all participants, they had different justifications.  The 







Interviewer:  What do you think is the problem here and how might it be solved? 
Researcher 1:  I see these people from the company not being right.  We know that the issue of 
HIV and AIDS
1
 and who will come up with a cure or whatever it involves money.  
To everybody the issue of HIV is a business. 
Interviewer: Ja. 
Researcher 1: Eh new products that come about that are working and if they are coming with 
that approach, saying that they want to take ownership, I see that as not being 
right. 
Researcher 1: Personally I believe that everybody has a right to receive help …  In the first place 
it shouldn’t be about money that eh …for there to even be conflict eh as to who 
discovered it first, the priority is for people to receive help with this herb, you see. 
Interviewer: Mm. 
Researcher 1: Money can follow behind but [the] first priority is that everybody should have 
access to this because in the first place it’s something natural, which grows on its 
own. 
 
Similar views were expressed by Researcher 2 in the following extract: 
 
Extract 2 
Researcher 2: … so definitely they’ll have to … they are running a business more than they are 
helping people.  So that is where it will begin and as much as I can say that, that 
would affect directly the person who will be getting it, so if there was a good 
agreement it could either be that the government subsidise that thing or that drug 
that has been tested and then a person will get it at a lesser price.  But definitely 
somebody will be paying more, it’s either the government when trying to help its 
people by subsidising or there is an actual person or an actual buyer of this cure 
who will pay more, you see.  
 
The researchers perceived the possibility of an ethical dilemma arising because of the imbalances 
in the way financial gains are distributed, especially if a researcher is researching a current and 
topical issue.  This speaks to the issues of justice and the equal distribution of the proceeds of 
research (Smith, 2000).  The following extract presents a similar view of what constitutes an 
ethical dilemma: 
                                                 
1






Researcher 3: So the traditional healers, I believe that at the time they had not thought about that 
they just thought that …  
Interviewer: Because their interest is to help people.  
Researcher 3: They help people mmm.  
Interviewer: They are not that concerned about what they would benefit?  
Researcher 3: That’s right.  That’s right, and also traditionally, a person does not pay before 
being healed.  Okay, the process of healing starts and only after being completely 
healed can one pay.  
Interviewer: Mmm. 
Researcher 3: However in the western way money comes first.  Healed or not money here.  
Interviewer: But you have to pay.  
Researcher 3: You see. 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Researcher 3: So that is where there are differences.  So I think the problem here arose because 
they exploited – I don’t know the word exploit in isiZulu … 
 
 
The above extract from Researcher 3 shares a similar view but also introduces an element of the 
differences in the way the African (traditional) and the Western (scientific) worldviews conceive 
the process of healing, where the latter conceives healing mainly as an income-generating 
process or scheme.  The researchers’ perspectives on this point differ from that of the CABs 
because of their different motivations for research. The CABs’ views are presented in the next 
two extracts:  
 
Extract 4 
CAB 1: Apart from wanting to be given the herbs for testing, it appears here that another 
aim is that they [researcher & pharmaceutical company] want to make profit for 
themselves after testing these plants/herbs.  
Extract 5 
CAB 2: Secondly, there is no hope that when it comes back, coming back having been 
corrected by western people, what role that they [traditional healers] will play and 





The extracts from the CABs show a lack of trust in and suspiciousness of outsiders (Western 
researchers) and their intentions for the traditional healers and the community at large.  The 
CABs expressed a concern that traditional healers and research participants were not given 
adequate information.  Similar views were expressed by community members previously 
involved in research: 
Extract 6 
Comm Res 1: I think that … if I hear this story correctly, the problem here is that the traditional 
healers came up with a herb that helped all the time.  After that, came this person 
from an overseas company who wanted to take over everything that was being 
done by these people [traditional healers].  The problem I see happening here is 
that this researcher of this overseas company does not want to come clean with the 
fact that he is not the one who came up with this herb.  [He must] make it clear 
that this herb is not his and that other people [traditional healers] discovered it … 
Interviewer: Mmm. 
Comm Res 1: The way it is now it’s like his company is the one that did this research on their 
own, whereas they took it from someone else … 
Interviewer: Mmm. 
Comm Res 1: What I can say is a problem here is the researcher’s failure to go to the others 
[traditional healers] and explain to them about their herb, ‘can I please take it and 
use it like this and that’ but they should also have a share …   
 
Extract 7 
Comm Res 2: They [pharmaceutical company] are going to do proper testing.  Isn’t it that they 
are taking it to do proper testing to see if it really cures this disease? – unless if 
they [pharmaceutical company] said that it is now theirs and that is where we can 
differ about ideas, if they claim it as theirs. 
 
The two following extracts are taken from the two community members who have never taken 
part in any research study previously.  They also had similar views as those expressed by the 






Comm 1: The difficult problem here is of that person who comes with the knowledge to 
steal from these other ones [traditional healers].  Taking knowledge away from 
these others [traditional healers] and they [pharmaceutical company] go and 
benefit from using this knowledge and gain success with knowledge stolen from 
the traditional healers, that is where I find it very much problematic.  
 
Extract 9 
Comm 2: Eh the problem is that eh from my point of view is that it seems like these people 
from overseas want to take knowledge from the traditional healers for free.  They 
go use it and benefit.  
Interviewer: Yes. 
Comm 2: Those they have taken the knowledge from benefit nothing.  That is where the 
problem is, they come and ask for this knowledge for free from us and pay 
nothing for it.  
 
The tension arising from the above extracts is mainly about justice, namely, the equal and fair 
distribution of financial gains and burdens between the researchers and the members of the 
community within which the research study focuses.  The principle of justice commends fairness 
and equity in the research process (Barry, 1988; Beauchamp & Walters, 1989; Benatar, 2002; 
McCaslin & Breton, 2008; Wassenaar, 2006).  For example, it is noted in Extract 1 that 
sometimes researchers lose sight of what is important for the collective and focus on individual 
gains.  In her view, helping people should be the researchers’ first priority, and not financial 
gain.  However, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has attracted great attention and research funding with 
obvious financial benefits for those who will develop a vaccine or a cure.  Underdeveloped 
countries, whose inhabitants are highly vulnerable to exploitation (Benatar, 2002; Emanuel, 
Wendler, Killen & Grady, 2004; Schulz-Baldes, Vayena & Biller-Andorno, 2007), are the ones 
who are the most affected by HIV/AIDS.  This factor facilitates entry by outsiders into 
indigenous communities and to patent locally profitable knowledge as their own with minimal 
benefits.  In developing countries “personnel costs are lowered, and it is easier to recruit 
participants” (Schulz-Bades et al., 2007, p.8).  For the indigenous community in this instance, an 





That indigenous people do not benefit from something they discovered creates unfairness and 
inequality, especially if their knowledge has been appropriated and patented.  This can mean that 
research participants have been exploited in the process of research by not being compensated 
accordingly for their participation in the study.  Jones (2004) agrees; she states that exploitation 
through patenting and unfair benefit sharing has not been rectified in many situations, usually 
because of indigenous people’s “lack of the financial resources required to challenge corporate 
patents” (Jones, 2004, p.2).  She makes an example of a native Madagascan plant, the rosy 
periwinkle plant, that has made huge amounts of profit for Eli Lilly, a pharmaceutical company.  
This plant contains active ingredients that helped develop anti-cancer drugs.  Madagascar, one of 
the poorest countries in the world, has barely received anything in return for their indigenous 
plant because Eli Lilly has patented it (Jones, 2004).  The Madagascan natives were clearly 
exploited in this case because there was no fairness in the distribution of the financial benefits 
accrued from their indigenous plants.   
 
Extract 3 above raises an interesting issue of how the indigenous healing processes have largely 
adopted the Western ways of healing and when payments are due.  This is partly attributed to the 
process of colonisation, which changed many aspects of indigenous people’s lives and many of 
the beliefs, values, cultural systems, relationship structures, inter alia, and were eroded to make 
space for what the West was bringing (McCaslin & Breton, 2008; Murove, 2005).  In traditional 
African healing, it is believed that a person has to get better first before he or she can pay for the 
services provided by the healer.  If the person is not healed, he or she is advised to seek more 
help and will eventually pay the healer who is able to provide the cure.  This supports the 
sustainability of good ongoing relationships that African people hold as one of their core values 
(McCaslin & Breton, 2008).  However, from a Western perspective, one has to pay even for a 
consultation or a mere referral because they ascribe to the notion “time is money”.  Western 
doctors sometimes do not believe or trust African traditional systems as they claim that they are 
not scientifically sound and “potentially harmful to patients” (Murove, 2005, p.18).  This was a 




South Africa when they were opposing the Traditional Health Practitioner’s Bill that the South 
African government introduced in the year 2004 (Murove, 2005).   
 
A great deal of injustice and societal imbalances were created during colonisation and the 
apartheid regime, which are now being addressed by using a legalistic framework.  This 
legalistic framework also comes from the West and has perpetuated the indigenous people’s 
problems because it is a system that is not within their frame of reference (McCaslin & Breton, 
2008).  The legalistic framework also brought with it laws and acts that favour Western agendas, 
interests and endeavours.  Consequently, frameworks such as the Fair Benefits Framework 
(Participants in the 2001 Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries, 
2001) and practical benchmarks as guidelines for researchers to fulfil research ethics 
requirements (Emanuel et al., 2004), were proposed as alternatives.  These alternatives were 
proposed as a result of the exploitation that existed flowing from colonisation and the apartheid 
regime, periods which were marked by a relationship of “power and inequality that continues to 
shape differential patterns of cultural dominance and social privilege” (Jones & Jenkins, 2008, 
p.473).  Researcher 3 in Extract 3 above touches on the issue of exploitation and expresses that it 
occurs because of the different worldviews held separately by African and Western cultures. 
 
The Fair Benefits Framework talks about reasonable availability of research benefits for the 
participants and the community at large.  It also complements the ethical principle code for 
research studies and emphasises the importance of individual informed consent (Participants, 
2001).  Broadly, it also advocates that participants should benefit from proven interventions of 
the research study long after its completion (Schulz-Baldes, Vayena & Biller-Andorno, 2007).  
Reasonable availability speaks of fairness in the distribution of benefits given that the focal 
community was adequately informed about the research goals and took part in the negotiation of 
research benefits.  Sufficient information is not usually given to people in developing countries 
and they run a greater risk of being exploited, as they may “assume the risks of research, but 




CAB members in Extracts 4 and 5 expressed this as a concern that instils mistrust and suspicion 
in research participants vis-à-vis Western researchers.  The Fair Benefits Framework has been 
criticised because while sound on paper, fairness does not necessarily translate into the practice 
of equality (Emanuel et al., 2004).  Therefore, plenty of room for exploitation of indigenous 
communities is still possible since the framework is also conceptualised from a Western 
epistemology. 
 
Bergum (2002) argues that justice as a theory and principle derives its existence and meaning 
from the moral theories of scholars such as Kant, Rawls and Mills.  These Western-based 
conceptions of justice differ from African and many other indigenous communities’ and 
societies’ conception.  McCaslin and Breton (2008) support this argument by stating that 
Western definitions of justice differ from those held by indigenous communities, especially 
where there is a history of colonisation and apartheid (e.g. South Africa).  The principle of 
justice becomes effective only when a research participant receives all the necessary information 
or services and the benefits due to him or her (Beauchamp & Walters, 1989).  Beauchamp and 
Walters (1989) state that it also helps when it is acknowledged that the principle of justice may 
be conceived differently depending on the different worldviews.  This allows for a shared 
understanding of the differences opening up possibilities of learning from the Other and will 
prevent taking possession of the Other’s resources without proper remuneration (Jones & 
Jenkins, 2008).  This has been alluded to in the discussions above.  The CABs in the interviews 
above talk about the unfairness and injustice of taking people’s knowledge under false pretence; 
not fully disclosing the intentions for requiring indigenous knowledge and later benefiting from 
that knowledge.  
 
Lastly, researchers are usually privileged and schooled in Western epistemology and culture; 
they hold powerful positions vis-à-vis the locale.  Automatically, an unequal power relationship 
develops between researchers and participants, especially if “some colonizer researchers who 




This is further perpetuated by the high rate of illiteracy and poverty amongst the research 
participants, especially from underdeveloped countries.  The researcher and the participant 
should work jointly to make certain that there is fairness and justice for the research participants.  
Schulz-Baldes, Vayena and Biller-Andorno (2007) emphasise that communities should be able to 
negotiate benefits that correspond to their communal needs, values and priorities before the 
research process begins.  But because limited education and high rate of poverty, on the part of 
indigenous communities, researchers often have more power that the participants.  Thus, 
negotiating benefits becomes difficult for the participants.  Equal sharing of benefits through 
“distributive justice” is considered “a fundamental test of equality” (NHMRC, 2003, p.15).  This 
is where appropriate distribution of research benefits and problems between all the stakeholders 
is done fairly (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Smith, 2000).  Distributive justice becomes a difficult 
outcome to achieve if, at beginning of the research, the motives and motivation of researchers 
and research participants were not the same.  Macleod (1983) supports this view by stating that 
justice has been objectified and has been made marketable and this “contributes to unevenness in 
the opportunities enjoyed by individuals as well as to inequality in both power and status” 
(p.553).   
 
4.1.2. Communal versus individual ownership of knowledge 
Another cause of ethical dilemmas in research that emerged from the interviews relates to the 
ownership of knowledge, that is, communal versus individual ownership.  Communal ownership 
means that all members of that community together own their indigenous knowledge systems, 
whereas, individual ownership of knowledge manifests itself primarily in the law of patents.  
These two contrasting knowledge systems, with their supporting extracts, will be presented 





4.1.2.1. Communal ownership of knowledge 
The first part of this section presents a general overview of what the participants in all categories 
thought about communal ownership of knowledge as a contributing factor to the ethical 
dilemma.  Two sub-themes emerged under communal ownership, namely, communal ownership 
and spirituality and knowledge as a gift from God. These are presented and discussed in detail 
below, with supporting extracts. 
 
Extract 10 
Researcher 2: I would definitely say they belong to the people of Nongoma. 
Interviewer: Mm. 
Researcher 2: They even belong to a child of Nongoma (laughs) you see … 
Interviewer: Mm. 
Researcher 2: As much as a child does not know what that plant is for or a lay man there on the 
ground who is not a traditional healer … 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Researcher 2: … not knowing what that plant is for, but there can’t be a person that can just 
invade a community and just … come and just take the plants you see … 
Interviewer: Mm. 
Researcher 2: … without the community knowing.  So, definitely they belong at kwaNongoma, 
they belong to the people of Nongoma.  So it’s like when something has to start 
working it has to start working for the community that it comes from before it 
works for other people coming from outside. 
 
Extract 11 
Researcher 2: Eh if these plants are within the community as you say, situated within – the 
community they are the property of the people living in that place traditionally it 
is like that …  
Interviewer: Mm. 
Researcher 2: … meaning that if the place is under the municipality, they are the municipality’s 
property … 
Interviewer: Ya. 






In the above two extracts from Researcher 2, he perceives ‘communal ownership’ to encompass 
everybody in that community.  He also said that communal ownership depends on the 
hierarchical structures active in that community.  He mentions that if the municipality owns the 
land, different procedures will be followed than if the land is owned by the chiefs as custodians 




CAB 1: It is now up to them if they agree that this knowledge can be researched and 
traditional healers as we speak they are from KwaZulu, which means they are 
governed, they are governed by chiefs. 
Interviewer: Mm. 
CAB 1: Eh these plants are the property of the chiefs.  Meaning that upon their arrival the 
researchers first go to the chiefs where they will get permission.  Thereafter, 
whatever happens must be in agreement with the chiefs and they must be satisfied 
that if these plants do leave, the community people will not lose it because 
knowledge [in the past] has been really lost … 
 
The extracts below point to sharing of information as an important element of communal 
ownership of knowledge, especially if the knowledge will maintain the well-being of the 
community.  This emphasises the collective, relational and interdependent nature of communal 
ownership of knowledge.  
 
Extract 13 
Researcher 3: Yes because it is the community’s knowledge and me as a member of that 
community I can use that knowledge.  
 
Researcher 3: That’s right. That is where he gets help because people are able – or many people 
do not know this law [the Bio Prospecting Act] very well because we [Africans], 
if something makes me well I go and tell others.  As to how the person who came 
up with this [the knowledge], benefits, [it] does not matter because we still 
believe that knowledge and other life matters are for everybody. 
 





African epistemology, which is multidisciplinary in scope, allows for there to be no limits to the 
knowledge discovered because rational logic or linear reasoning is not applied (Grills, 2004).  
Knowledge is shared with people from within and outside of a community because communal 
knowledge is not bound by space and time (Grills, 2004).  Communal ownership is the view that 
there has to be a joint effort in the discovery and maintenance of communal knowledge.  
Researcher 2 in Extract 10 above speaks to this by stating that even a child of that community 
jointly and equally owns the indigenous knowledge.  Logical thinking or reasoning might view a 
child as too young to own indigenous knowledge.  While the child may not have discovered the 
knowledge per se they might play a significant role in the maintenance of the communal 
knowledge by passing it down to other generations.  This is because indigenous knowledge is 
acquired “through the accumulation of experiences, informal experiments and intimate 
understanding of the environment in a given culture” (Msuya, 2007, p.3).  These experiences are 
often shared by all people in a given culture. 
 
The element of sharing all that communal ownership of knowledge encompasses makes it vital.  
A person, as part of a community, has an obligation to all other members.  Therefore, if one 
discovers something worthwhile or in the best interests of the community, he or she is obligated, 
out of good will, to share that knowledge with the rest of the community members.  Such act of 
goodwill is much valued by all community members, especially if the knowledge discovered will 
help build and maintain the health of the community.  This happens because the community’s 
needs come before the individual’s (Grills, 2004; Harding, 1998; Mkhize, 2004).  This is a 
selfless act associated with being African because in the African context an individual’s well-
being “depends fundamentally upon the welfare of the community, rather than the community’s 
welfare depending upon the welfare of the individuals who constitute it” (Harding, 1998, p.364).  
The person is positively reinforced for his or her efforts of wanting to identify with all other 
community members; this is what being African is about.  Researcher 6 illustrated this point well 





Wiredu (1980, as cited by Omoregbe, 1998) speaks about the concept of community thought, 
which he says is not attributed to any specific philosophers.  This is because community thought 
“mean[s] nothing other than the thought of individuals in the community, for thinking is always 
done by individuals” (Omoregbe, 1998, p.6).  But these individual thinkers and philosophers, or 
traditional healers in this scenario, as much as they are individuals, share the same African 
traditional philosophy that helped them engage in critical reflections about the core issues arising 
from their experience of human life, which is contextualised to their communities (Omoregbe, 
1998).  Therefore the knowledge acquired, even though it was thought of by individuals, 
becomes common property of the community, for “the community is not a collection of 
fundamentally isolated individuals, but is ontologically primary” (Harding, 1998, p.364).  Also 
the individual does not lose recognition for the idea or knowledge he or she came up with 
because it is through that community recognising and acknowledging that knowledge or idea, 
that it becomes known and appreciated within and outside of his or her cultural context.    
 
It is evident in the extracts above that the participants of this research believe that knowledge is a 
shared property of the community.  In this view, knowledge is for the good health of the 
community.  This occurs because “the individual’s position in social space is relative to others … 
The individual is not a human being except as he is part of a social order” (Dixon, 1976, as cited 
by Harding, 1998, p.363).  This belief is supported by an isiZulu proverb that says “zifa 
ngamvunye”; this can be translated in English as “standing in unity”. This means that what 
happens to one person in the community affects all other members because they live 
interdependently of each other (Gambu, 2000; Harding, 1998; Matsumoto, 1996; Mkhize, 2004; 
Triandis, 1989).  This is one of the reasons why an individual seeking knowledge becomes 
emotionally invested and involved with the knowledge, because he or she understands his or her 
obligation to the community.  The individual’s feelings, beliefs and values are instrumental in 
determining how he or she interacts with that knowledge.  Thus one is not able to separate 
oneself from or be impartial to the knowledge gained or discovered (Grills, 2004; Harding, 1998; 




when there was much less awareness of exploitation and indigenous knowledge was appropriated 
and lost to the founding indigenous community and CAB 1 in Extract 12 illustrated this.  
 
4.1.2.1.1. Communal ownership and spirituality 
Spirituality is another core aspect of communal ownership of knowledge in the African 
cosmology (Grills, 2004).  This incorporates a belief that all that exists on earth is provided for 
by God and other spiritual beings, working together with God to provide normality and 
connectivity between humans and nature (Grills, 2004).  In African cultures, God’s agents 
include the living, future and past generations (ancestors) as owners of knowledge.  Presently 
living beings are responsible for retaining and passing knowledge that is usually stored in their 
memory that was passed on to them by previous generations.  Future generations (children 
already born and those yet to be born) have ownership of their community’s knowledge systems.  
They are entrusted with the responsibility of carrying the legacy of their indigenous knowledge 
forward and passing it on to future generations. 
 
Extract 14 
Interviewer: What does it [the scenario] also tell us about the processes of healing and ethics? 
Researcher 3: Your ancestors call you.  Then when you have been called, they will show you the 
herbal plants.  So, even the way you give out those herbal medicines and even the 
healing process is different because the person being healed is seen as God’s 
subject,[he/she] godly.  The person was brought by the ancestors to get help from 
you.  
Interviewer: Yes. 
Researcher 3: It is not like in the Western ways.  So, this is where we differ with Western 
people.  Firstly, it is spiritual healing then a physical healing.  That is why we 
start by saying go perform some ritual and then come back or give us something 
and we will perform a ritual and slaughter maybe a cow and so on.  This is to 
speak to the ancestors and it is then that the herbal medicines will work. 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Researcher 3: … because a person – healing is a holistic thing.  Even if you have a hand injury, 





Researcher 3 in Extract 14 above expressed the spiritual connection of the presently living with 
the ancestors and how this impacts on the healing systems of African people.  He states that 
healing is conceived in spiritual rather than physical terms.  The person is assessed holistically to 
determine all the factors, be they attributable to the individual or family, that might be 
contributing to his or her illness. Mbiti (1969 as cited by Toldson & Toldson, 2001) argued that 
the process of healing in Africa is collectively “believed to be a function of every thought, 
emotion and activity toward creating balance in the individual” (p.404).  The assessment of the 
imbalances that cause the individual’s illness is done at all levels and this includes the spiritual 
world of ancestors as they may provide answers to where the problem lies and how it may be 
resolved.  Similar views were expressed by the CAB members in the extracts captured below: 
 
Extract 15 
CAB 1: Maybe just because people [traditional healers] also work with the ancestors, they 
know that if they get a certain amount of herbal medicines, the ancestors tell you 
how much should be given to each person.  
 
Extract 16 
CAB 2: Eh the way I see it, what is at stake for them especially is that they have lost their 
herbal plants that maybe they were still going to develop further and discover that 
‘add such a plant’ because most of the time their formulas appear in their dreams.   
Interviewer: Yes.  
CAB 2: A person is told in dreams that ‘you see for such a herb to beat that disease you 
need to add such and such’. Now their knowledge is gone and changed before it 
reached its highest point. 
 
CAB 2 in Extract 16 also raised one of the ways in which the ancestors are able to pass down 
knowledge, i.e. through dreams.  A community member that has not previously participated in 







Comm 2: They [the herbs] are yours; the person that has been gifted with [them] because it 
was not of your own [traditional healers] doing that you just have this knowledge.  
It is your deceased family elders that have given you the gift to know these plants.  
Interviewer: So they stay with you as a person that …? 
Comm 2: They are in my heart … 
 
The spiritual element of communal ownership of knowledge brings a sense of knowledge as 
extended or diffused so that everybody has it regardless of their position in the community.  
Those yet to be born or recently born form an important part of the community because they will 
soon begin to learn, in the context of their community, certain communal and cultural concepts 
that will help develop the mind (Wiredu, 1996).  Ancestors are also another entity that needs to 
be involved in consenting to the transfer of communal knowledge to the presently living.  The 
communication between ancestors and the presently living occurs through dreams, spiritual 
transitions and performance of traditional rituals (Mkhize, 2004; Wiredu, 1996).  This 
communication is symbolically done and the individual has to be able to read and interpret those 
symbols that were revealed to him or her in dreams (Grills, 2004; Mkhize, 2004).  Knowledge in 
this context is not seen as a commodity in the free market, where anybody can have it; it is a gift 
from one’s ancestors.  The above Extracts 14, 15, 16 and 17, illustrated this point.    
 
The ancestors do not only pass on the knowledge, they also guide the person handling traditional 
herbs how to mix them for the best result for a specific patient (Extract 15).  This communication 
is vital because the goal of the presently living “is to maintain the divinely established order and 
maintain the transcendental structures which sustain normality, not to escape them or view them 
as evil, profane or illusionary” (Grills, 2004, p.183).  This further speaks of a web of 
relationships that exists in African cosmology, where everything is interconnected and exists in 
relation to each other.  The provision of knowledge by the ancestors to the living is seen as a gift 
that is highly valued in indigenous communities and cultures.  But the ancestors also received 
this information from God, the Supreme Being in African thought (Grills, 2004).  However, 
because of the pressures that Western culture, globalisation, colonisation and the apartheid 
regime have put on indigenous knowledge systems, most of it has become a commodity in the 




indigenous knowledge is susceptible of being sold and bought out of that community.  The 
commoditisation of indigenous knowledge has subsequently led to the constant devaluation of 
such knowledge. 
 
4.1.2.1.2. Knowledge as a gift from God 
While the element of spirituality was present in the interviews with the researchers, they mainly 
cited God as the owner of all knowledge.  An ethical dilemma in this instance occurs when 
individuals feel the need to privatise or assume ownership of what God has created naturally.  
God was referred to as “uMdali”, uNkulunkulu and “uMvelinqangi”, all isiZulu names for the 
Creator of all things or the Supreme Being.  The following extracts illustrate this point: 
 
Extract 18 
Researcher 1: … but we should give them [traditional healers] a – that right that they discovered 
this.  So they should have those powers to say they discovered it, not powers in a 
bad way but to be honoured that we are grateful that you were able to establish 
this thing you see … 
Interviewer: Ja. 
Researcher 1: But there should also be that humanity to say that anyway this is something 
created naturally by God, anyone can have access to it … 
 
Extract 19 
Researcher 3: … it is moving slowly.  Eh and these other [researchers] appear. One group has 
knowledge of the plants and the others have machines. These two should be on 
the same side. Plants in a traditional sense are considered to be God’s, okay, they 
are God’s. 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Researcher 3: No one can just say that this garden, land is all mine, that these plants even if I 






The researchers agreed that God is the main owner of all that resides on earth.  Plants and 
knowledge of African traditional terms belong to God and no individual can say that he or she 
owns that knowledge; that would constitute competing against God.  The African philosophy of 
spirituality holds a strong belief that God is omnipotent; the greatest source of power (Grills, 
2004; Parrinder, 1969).  All that individual human beings possess is a gift from the Creator.  This 
belief goes beyond the social and psychological realities of people because it involves how 
indigenous people live collectively with surrounding environments.  They also believe that 
because God created these plants, anybody can have access to them.  However, those plants 
would not have been of any use if the traditional healers did not have the powers to decipher and 
make meaning of the symbols sent to them through dreams and other means of ancestral 
communication, for example, through “libation and sacrifices” (Mkhize, 2004, p.40).  Therefore, 
the traditional healers should be honoured and acknowledge because they were instrumental in 
discovering the indigenous plants and the concomitant knowledge. 
 
The conflict arises when Western epistemology is employed in writing about and interpreting 
African spirituality because it “tends to reduce the profound spiritual reality of African deities to 
merely social and psychological factors” (Ray, 2000, p.35).  This could be characterised as a 
failure on the part of social anthropologists.  Some social anthropologists do not have a strong or 
deep understanding of their own cultural theories while others that are familiar with their own 
cultural theories are blinded into thinking theirs is superior (Horton, 1998).  Having discussed the 
communal approach to knowledge ownership, the following section looks at ownership of 
knowledge from the dominant western perspective. 
 
4.1.2.2. Individual ownership of knowledge  
Individual ownership of knowledge is largely associated with the individualistic conception of 
the self, characterised by separateness, independence and conflict between humans and nature 






Researcher 3: No one can just say that this garden, land is all mine, that these plants even if I 
didn’t plant them are mine, okay … 
Interviewer: Yes. 
 
Researcher 3: White people on the other side say that ‘all that is here in my place is mine. If I 
have bought this land, this land is mine even the rats that live here’. So, that is 
why they go and buy land and find wild animals and claim that even these wild 
animals are theirs. Okay, [you] cannot come and hunt here because they are mine. 
Eh but they did not give birth to those things, okay. 
 
This is a Western conception of knowledge; it does not accord much power to God as the creator 
and owner of knowledge because individuals believe that they are in charge of their destinies.  
These individuals further believe that they are the owners of their capacities and talents which 
Sampson (1993) calls possessive individualism.  This view simultaneously creates a negative 
self-other relationship because if one is looking out for his or her own self-interest first, it will be 
challenging to put others first (Sampson, 1993).  
 
4.1.2.2.1. Patenting 
Patenting is a field of the law that protects individual’s rights to intellectual property as long as 
he or she has proof that a certain plant, a design, etc, is a new innovation or discovery (Britz & 
Lipinski, 2001).  The research participants in this study expressed that they were against this law 
because it seemed to be protecting those individuals who succeed in appropriating indigenous 
knowledge systems.  In South Africa, appropriation of knowledge was easier in the past, owing 
to the legacy of colonialism and apartheid. In the following extracts, the participants express 
their views about the law of patents and its dangers. 
 




CAB 1: Eh the results, the problem that will surface if they take these plants and go 
overseas with them for testing, is that there is this thing called patenting, which 
means that now it is me who discovered this thing and nobody else can touch that 
tree … 
Interviewer: Mm. 
CAB 1: Even if the tree belongs to the chief’s land you can no longer touch that tree as it 
will be protected.  You can no longer use it. 
 
Extract 22 
CAB 1: Eh – what is at risk here, if there is no agreement, the traditional healers will not 
be trusted again in this community because it could happen that the white people 
could take the herbal plants and never come back with them.  And then it will be 
announced that the herbal plants that are indigenous at Nongoma, people should 
not use them anymore because they now belong to certain people.  Those herbs do 
such and such activities and they should not be touched because they are protected 
by the law that we don’t even know [about]. 
 
Extract 23 
CAB 1: The problem, they [locals] have been using these herbal plants for many years.  
The communities now find out that they cannot use [the plants] because the 
researchers have prohibited them.  They came and took it where the people didn’t 
have the knowledge of what research means and also how knowledge is protected 
because it now means that their indigenous knowledge was not protected.  
Indigenous knowledge will be lost [if it is] unprotected and [traditional healers] 
will not be able to use their indigenous plants because they are prohibited and they 
will only be accessible to those that say the plants are theirs when in fact they got 
them from the traditional healers. 
 
The above extracts (21, 22 and 23), from a CAB member who is also a traditional healer, express 
the dangers that could be faced with outsider researchers appropriating indigenous knowledge.  
Sometimes even the law has favoured and given them the legal rights to own what is not 
historically theirs.  Thus the need has arisen for traditional or indigenous communities to start 




given adequate and appropriate information about these laws so that alternative agendas that the 
researchers have could be fulfilled.  Researcher 3 in Extract 24 below shares a similar view and 
adds the individualistic way of life that Western people may share. 
 
Extract 24 
Researcher 3: Eh but [okwabelungu] white people say that ‘whatever I do, no matter that it is 
going to help the community, there must be something in it for me’. 
Interviewer: I must get something in return. 
Researcher 3: So there is patenting and patent rights … 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Researcher 3: They believe a lot in that. 
 
Extract 25 
Researcher 3: Ja.  So, it should be that they both have that right so it’s a sort of joint custody of 
the knowledge.  But the custodians who came with the knowledge are the people 
who started with it. 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Researcher 3: They [researchers] just came with technology; so they can patent the technology, 
but the knowledge of the plants belong to the traditional healers. 
 
In the above extract (25), patenting is perceived as something that is foreign to African people.  
This was made clear specifically by saying that to patent is “okwabelungu”, meaning it belongs 
to Western or white people’s culture and Western people believe a lot in it.  This was seen as one 
of Western people’s core values and strongest beliefs, that is, even if something is going to help 
the greater community’s well-being, it cannot be done for free.  A person always expects 
something material or monetary in return, in contrast to the African communal belief systems.  
Also, the use of ‘they’ and ‘them’ as a distinction from ‘we’ or ‘us’ was evident in trying to 
differentiate between African and Western people.  Similar views were raised by the community 
members previously not involved in research.  The use of identification and differentiation of 






Comm 1: The thing that will have bad consequences if the white people can take these herbs 
and keep them to themselves, maybe the doctors, and then we will have problems.  
Especially, as they have some farms where they say there is no trespassing, only 
certain people are allowed to dig.  We then have a problem because we can no 
longer get what we need outside of this programme that is still being developed to 
plant some of these herbal plants so that they do not become extinct. 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Comm 1: That could also help a lot.  Even though it [patenting] helps it also hurts a bit 
because you cannot as a person just go and get your own herbal plants, you need 
to have a letter that allows you to go and get what you need and you get it in small 
quantities, it is measured.  
 
Extract 27  
 
Comm 2 : It is clear that you can get arrested if you are found with a certain herbal plant. 
You are not supposed to have it as the legal people protect it their way. Some of it 
really has consequences like that.  
Interviewer: Yes. 
Comm 2: For example, like izigqiki zoMkhovu (herbal plant) you are not allowed to plant it 
and Nukani (herbal plant), you are not supposed to be found with them and an 
individual and even Losilina (herbal plant).  If you are caught with these plants 
you get in trouble, even Izinyamazane (herbal plant). 
 
The extracts above, from the community members who are also traditional healers, highlight the 
problems patenting poses to indigenous people.  Patenting prohibits indigenous people from any 
further use of the plants and knowledge that they originally discovered and nurtured for many 
years.  This constitutes an ethical dilemma because indigenous or community people lose 
something that has been contributing to their livelihood because of Western interferences. 
 
A greater sense of knowledge, understanding and implications caused by patenting of indigenous 
knowledge exists amongst all stakeholders in this research depending on their position in the 
communities.  Patenting is a legal monopolistic right which is given to an individual or 
company/group to “exclude others and give the public what it did not have earlier” (Britz & 
Lipinski, 2001, p.238).  Patenting is a legalistic system that is widely accepted in Western 




individual has to prioritise self-interests.  Britz and Lipinski (2001) agree that this occurs to the 
detriment of indigenous knowledge systems because the “Western patent law does not easily 
support the shared contribution of the shaman” (Britz & Lipinski, 2001, p.239).  
 
The case of the San people and their usage of the Hoodia Gordonii, a Kalahari Desert cactus, is 
an example of the patenting of indigenous plants.  The San people had for many years used the 
Hoodia plant to suppress appetite during long hunting trips (Terblanche, 2007).  As the years 
progressed the way of life of the San came under scrutiny and research studies were done on how 
they lived.  This is how the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) discovered this 
plant and took it for further testing.  Its chemical structure and usage were determined and the 
plant was patented at first by the CSIR who later sold their patent to UK-based pharmaceutical 
companies without any involvement of the San people (Terblanche, 2007).  The San were no 
longer allowed to use their own plants, which were communally owned, because a certain 
individual or institution had taken legal possession of it and stood to benefit enormously from it.  
The San people on the other hand stood to gain very little if anything from the usage of their 
indigenous plant.  The unfairness of this is frighteningly obvious.  This seems to be what the 
traditional healers in South Africa are experiencing with regards to some of the herbal plants like 
Nukani, Izinyamazane, Izigqiki Zomkhovu, etc, that they now need permission to possess, even as 
part of their herbal medicines.   
 
Patenting has a certain number of stipulations that an individual has to satisfy before registering 
it and technology is used to determine, test to check the reliability of the information given.  The 
technology used for testing most often belongs to and is operated from the Western conception 
of things, which tends to alienate others, especially indigenous people because of their 
unfamiliarity with such techniques.  Indigenous people sometimes interpret the domination of 
Western technology as yet another way the West assumes more power and status over them.  
This can lead to mistrust and even defensiveness, which may create a bad name for intellectual 
property rights (Jones, 2004).  This is also because traditional knowledge, which is shared, fails 




to satisfy “the ‘novelty’ requirement alone, to say nothing of the ‘utility’ and ‘capable of 
industrial application’s requirements of the test” (Jones, 2004, p.4).  This is because traditional 
knowledge has been in existence for many years being passed down through generations thus 
making it difficult to trace the individuals who originated the knowledge.   
 
4.1.3. Ways of knowing and validating of knowledge 
The participants seemed to identify two different ways of validating knowing, 
empirical/scientific method and ‘revealed’ knowledge.  These ways differed in their fundamental 
assumptions about knowledge and being.  The empirical/scientific method values science and 
technical validations, which speaks of value free knowledge characterised by the knower 
standing apart from that knowledge (Mkhize, 2004).  African revealed knowledge, on the other 
hand, values embodied knowledge; the knowing subject is not separate from that which is to be 
known (Mkhize, 2004; Sampson, 1993).  In the interviews, the different terms such as “isintu” or 
“African” and “okwaseNtshona” (of the West) were constantly used by participants.  The term 
“abelungu” was commonly used by the participants.  This word has its origins from the isiXhosa 
and isiZulu languages to mean white people.  The participants also used terms such as “okwethu” 
meaning ours and “okwabo” meaning theirs to differentiate between the two ways of knowing.  
Most of these words had to be translated to English.  In this scenario most participants, especially 
the community members and the CABs, included themselves as part of what the traditional 
healers were going through.  In other words, they, as black South Africans, identified more with 
the traditional healers and used ours and theirs to differentiate. 
 
4.1.3.1. Empirical testing versus ‘received’ or ‘revealed’ knowledge  
The two ways of knowing identified by the researcher participants, namely, empirical validation 
associated with Western epistemology, and revealed knowledge associated with African 
epistemology, are highlighted in the following extracts. 




Researcher 2: Uhh I think it gives us two different pictures about our indigenous knowledge that 
we have and the way we generate our indigenous knowledge and the way other 
countries generate theirs because one challenge like in this scenario is that the 
traditional healers don’t have proper testing tools, like it is not well detailed the 
way they test (laughs) …   
Interviewer: Mm. 
Researcher 2: … so as a result they can only do one thing at the end and say that the herbal 
medicine works, but it is that there is a detail in the process and even the way the 
western countries do their tests is different, so as a result they have to have a 
written paper that says this is how this research was done and it was done by so 
and so as a result these are the findings so that they can take ownership of that.  
 
Extract 29  
Researcher 2: … but [let’s] take it a step further because you see many things nowadays are 
being done in a Western way, the Western ways are recognised more than the 
African ways you see …  
 
Researcher 2 in Extracts 28 and 29 spoke of the Western influence and domination over African 
cultures.  He also spoke about the differences with respect to the preservation of knowledge, with 
Western knowledge being written whilst African knowledge is predominantely oral.  A 
community member previously involved in research in Extract 30 below touched on the 
differences added by technological advancement of Western culture.   
 
Extract 30  
Comm Res: The way I see it, I see these people from the West coming to these people 
[traditional healers], this herb is now going to have a guarantee that it is working 
in the right way because now they will go and research it in the laboratory, where 
they will be able to determine for sure as to how effective this plant is because 
they have been using it before without proper research …   
 
Western scientific and traditional indigenous ways of knowledge validation differ (Mkhize, 
2004; Sue & Sue, 1999).  In the Western conception, knowledge is only valid once it is 
scientifically or objectively proven by means of laboratory analysis.  It is believed that 




Therefore, the knower and the known are separated and independent of each other.  This is 
attainable in the Western self-contained conception of the self because the knowing subject “is 
stripped of all particularities such as gender, culture, position, and of his or her existence in space 
and time” (Mkhize, 2004, p.30).  However, in African thought the knower and the known are 
inseparable.  
 
Extract 31  
Researcher 3: Your ancestors call you.  Then when you have been called, they will show you the 
herbal plants.  So, even the way you give out those herbal medicines and even the 
healing process is different because the person being healed is seen as God’s 




Researcher 3: It is not like in the Western ways.  So, this is where we differ with Western 
people.  Firstly, it is spiritual healing then a physical healing.  That is why we 
start by saying go perform some ritual and then come back or give us something 
and we will perform a ritual and slaughter maybe a cow and so on.  This is to 
speak to the ancestors and then that is where the herbal medicines is going to 
work. 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Researcher 3: … because a person – healing is a holistic thing.  Even if you have a hand injury, 
that injury is not just that … 
 
Received or revealed knowledge on the other hand demands that human beings pay attention to 
what is presented to them through the richness of African stories and also through the 
interpretation of dreams.  Mutwa (2003) states that at first glance, African stories may seem 
“rather childish and primitive but which on closer examination are revealed to hide mind-
boggling facts about the depth of knowledge our forefathers possessed” (p.61).  This belief 
occurs because of the spiritual interconnectedness that exists between human beings, ancestors 
and their surrounding environments.  Dreams serve as part of revealed knowledge because, while 
they often contain important messages to humankind,  it is only if they are noticed, recognised 
and acted upon that they come true (Mutwa, 2003).  This becomes a spiritual aspect of the 




been seen before, but strongly believed to exist by a vast majority of Africans and other non-
Western cultures.  It is therefore apparent that ways of knowing in Africa are largely connected 
to the spirituality of the people and that nothing happens without reason, even illness itself.   
 
4.1.3.2. Documentation 
In terms of how Western and African worldviews differ on the ways they handle knowledge, the 
participants talked about different levels of preserving knowledge.  In the African worldview 
(ngokwesintu) knowledge in not written but held in the memories of older generations.  
Documentation is an important part of preserving knowledge in Western tradition because it is 
assumed that if a certain phenomenon was unwritten, it means it never occurred.  The extracts 
below illustrate this point. 
 
Extract 32 
Researcher 2: … the whole operation because we, the traditional healers operate in a traditional 
manner of which it’s not something that is written down.  Eh … how can I say 
this?  Eh … [our knowledge is not] documented so that it will be known that this 
is intellectual property owned by so and so you see … 
 
Extract 33 
Researcher 2: So because all these things were not written, that knowledge was not written as 
well … 
Interviewer: Ja. 
Researcher 2: So because it was not documented anywhere and was not published they can 
never claim ownership of that knowledge.  So the outsiders will come and give us 
what is theirs in fact not give us theirs, but they take what we have and they 
document it nicely and then they say it is theirs … 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Researcher 2: Because they always say if it’s not written it’s never happened. 
 
Western culture, in particular, believes that knowledge has value only when written or 




“Western civilization, owes its origin to writing” (p.13).  This occurred as a form of 
systematising knowledge, which led to many books being written and published.  However, this 
kind of knowledge tends to be removed from its context of origin and mostly offers abstract and 
analytical discourses (Biakolo, 2002).  Therefore, if the African and Western worldviews come 
together they are bound to cause an ethical dilemma.  This is evident from the first writings of 
Western civilisation, where African people were perceived as being primitive, barbaric, 
underdeveloped and pre-logic thinkers with savage minds (Biakolo, 2002).  Jones (2004) agrees 
with this argument, stating that the two ways of knowing “embody different values and a 
different vision” (p.3).  
 
On the contrary, African cultures value the oral tradition of knowledge.  Because of this 
difference in the preservation of knowledge, African culture is less recognised because it is not 
recorded in the written word but held in the hearts and minds of great people, the elders in 
particular.  Unfortunately, Western values and vision tend to dominate indigenous knowledge 
systems leading to the former being almost eroded.  The erosion occurs because Western systems 
of knowledge do not recognise and appreciate indigenous knowledge systems.  This has led to 
more and more indigenous people having adopted the Western ways of knowing and this has led 
to a need for African people to start documenting their indigenous knowledge for the fear of it 
becoming extinct.  This has come at a high cost to the oral tradition as its richness lies in its oral 
transmission.  Credo Mutwa, one of South Africa’s great High Sanusi or Sangoma and sculptor, 
talks about his internal conflict when he started documenting indigenous knowledge: 
 
“Ultimately I saw that the lore of my people was destined to die with those of us who 
knew it, and that it would then die forever.  I felt I gradually recognised that by breaking 
my oath – something originally made to protect the sacred lore in times that were very 
different from these times – I was doing something for my own people, preserving the 
eternal wisdom that been carried on for centuries; and also doing something for mankind 





To conclude this section, participants understood ethical dilemmas arose from imbalances in the 
way the proceeds of research were shared.  Ethical dilemmas also arose because of differences 
between communal and individual ownership of knowledge, the latter manifesting itself 
primarily in the law of patents.  Lastly, the different ways of knowing and validating, namely, 
empirical/scientific validation and revealed/received knowledge, contributed towards the critical 
dilemmas that they faced.  The following section reports and discusses the mechanisms of 
resolving these ethical dilemmas as suggested by the research participants.  
 
4.2. Mechanisms of resolving ethical dilemmas 
Three main mechanisms emerged: the legalist framework versus the tradition framework of 
ethical decision-making.  The legalistic framework also presents itself as the Bio-Prospecting 
Act, which intends to protect indigenous knowledge systems.  These are presented and discussed 
below.  The legalistic and indigenous dispute-resolution frameworks are presented together in 
order to compare and contrast them. 
 
4.2.1. Tension between the legalistic and indigenous dispute resolution 
The legalistic framework “give[s] primacy to the individual and emphasises individual rights, 
self-determination, and privacy” (Muller, 1994, p.450).  It is grounded on the principle of 
autonomy and individualistic decision-making.  On the other hand, indigenous framework of 
dispute-resolution frameworks value communal decision-making, where community members 
are recognised as having roles and duties in dispute resolution.  Tensions between the two 
approaches were evident in the research.  
 
Extract 36 




Researcher 3: So the legal system is the one that can resolve this. 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Researcher 3: Traditionally, ages ago they would have gone to the chief. 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Researcher 3: Mmh, and explain to the chief.  Eh when they get to the chief they explain.  The 
chief will take a decision: ‘my people here is what we used to live with and here 
is what these others are coming with’.  
Interviewer: Yes.  So traditionally they went to the chief and in the modern way if I may say 
so, they would use the legal system … 
Researcher 3: Ja, because in this … in South Africa the legal system has the power for now … 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Researcher 3: … the law of justice, eh the courts or magistrates, okay, that is where (inaudible). 
Interviewer: That is where the law has the power? 
Researcher 3: It is where the law has power.  The chiefs unfortunately, the chiefs have had their 
powers taken away.  
 
The above extract shows the tension between indigenous and legalistic dispute-resolution 
mechanisms.  A community member previously involved in research expressed similar views in 
the following extract:  
 
Extract 37 
Comm Res 2: Yes, the ethical dilemma is abuse/exploitation. (.).  I think that this would call for 
legal advisors to resolve this between us. 
 
It is apparent from the extract above that there seems to a marked difference between the 
legalistic framework and the traditional framework of resolving an ethical dilemma.  The 
legalistic framework was first introduced as a rational method to deal with the different ethical 
dilemmas that arise as a result of human conduct (Muller, 1994).  It is largely individualistic and 
focuses on that individual that has done wrong and metes out punishment to the wrongdoer.  The 
Western cultural and epistemological influence is evident.  This framework involves obtaining 
legal representation and going through the court system, which is removed from the individual’s 
context.  Muller (1994) argued that “moral dilemmas and the means to resolving them cannot be 
separated from the institutional, political, economic, social and cultural contexts in which they 




used in South Africa for example, still bears many challenges for the majority of South Africans 
who do not identify with this framework. 
 
This system of justice differs from that employed by traditional people before the legal system 
was introduced.  This traditional system focused on reparation and restoring good relationships 
and harmony (McCaslin & Breton, 2008).  A process known in isiZulu as isigcawu or isigungu, 
translated by McCaslin and Breton (2008) as a peacemaking circle, occurs.  The community 
chief and elders would sit and talk about ways of addressing a certain issue that was brought to 
their attention.  A decision that accorded with the matter at hand and reconnected the community 
harmoniously would be collectively taken.  The extract above speaks to the resolution of the 
ethical dilemma of appropriation of knowledge by looking at the two different mechanisms, the 
legalistic framework and the traditional framework and the process that each follows. 
 
The traditional process of ethical decision-making, which is communal and relational, is 
unfortunately one of the indigenous systems that were eroded with the introduction of the 
legalistic framework.  The community is no longer consulted on issues concerning its members.  
It no longer has the power to take decisions, such as disciplinary measures for its inhabitants to 
try and collectively monitor and manage an individual’s behaviour.  The justice system, a 
Western phenomenon, which is largely impersonal and individualistic, has brought about a new 
set of challenges that the indigenous community sometimes fails to deal with as they may not 
have the proficiency to (McCaslin & Breton, 2008).  It has also been argued that the introduction 
of this legalistic framework has led to the disempowerment of many traditional community 
leaders such as chiefs, community elders and traditional healers.  It has also led to the breakdown 





4.2.2. Bio-Prospecting Act 
One of the members of the Community Advisory Boards (CAB 1) referenced the Bio-
Prospecting Act, an example of a South African law that has recently been developed to make 
clear the boundaries of researching and testing of indigenous plants.  It also serves to protect 
indigenous plants and knowledge. 
Extract 38 
CAB 1:  … Department of Environmental Affairs.  This law is called the Bio-Prospecting 
Act and it guides or makes clear or that protects or directs the way research of 
indigenous plants here in South Africa.  Eh this law protects indigenous 
knowledge of traditional healers and stipulates that if traditional healers work 
jointly with scientists there must be an agreement.  If this agreement is in place, it 
explains the discussion about what benefits or what is otherwise known as benefit 
shares … 
 
According to the Bio-Prospecting Act, chapter 6 of the Biodiversity Act (Act 10 of 2004), it is 
illegal not to acknowledging the original founder of knowledge.  A disadvantage for the 
traditional healers is that some of them do not have any knowledge about this Act.  It is the duty 
of community advisory board members to educate traditional healers and the community at large 
about this Act and other legal aspects pertinent to the preservation and protection of their 
indigenous knowledge.  The argument is that if traditional healers are well informed, they will be 
able to protect and preserve their indigenous knowledge.  However, this is not to say that 
traditional healers do not have the knowledge, it is just that they are the holders of indigenous or 
traditional knowledge, which is different from the Western systems of knowledge which the Bio-
Prospecting Act is based on.  Nevertheless, the introduction of this Act seemed imperative for 
the protection of indigenous resources.  For example, in South Africa, before the introduction of 
the Bio-Prospecting Act, there had been uncontrolled access to “bioresources, with materials 
being harvested, sometimes in destructive excessive quantities, and being exported to research 
and development node abroad, for innovative value addition, and off shore financial benefit” 
(Crouch, Douwes, Wolfson, Smith & Edwards, 2008, p.355).  These offshore countries benefited 




of that profit, as was similar in the case of the San people, Australian Aborigines and 
Madagascan natives.   
 
4.2.3. Prior Agreements 
In line with communal processes of decision-making, the participants expressed that all parties 
involved in the research process should sit down prior to the research study and agree on how the 




Comm 2 Yes.  The decision that I usually think about is that if we meet with those from the 
other side and for us not to be suspicious of them that they want to take our plants, 
and take our knowledge.  If they need our knowledge they must come and sit on 




Comm 2: The researchers from that side and the traditional healers from this side, must sit 
down and discuss how they will get the help they need from us because we may 
also need help from them.  
 
Extract 41 
Comm Res 2: Them claiming it as theirs would call for us to sit down and discuss with them that 
if it is going to be theirs there are things that should happen in that process.  We 
must agree that we are trading it and there must also be payments of that herb 






CAB 1: Now he arrives when they are already on top of it.  Now this means that … eh the 
problem now is that it seems like there is no proper agreement eh, they have not 
made it clear here as the researchers, that as they now want to deve … help in that 
eh, they do not make it clear how will the others benefit?  
 
Extract 43 
CAB 1: Now the owners of knowledge are not going to benefit.  Eh, this means that this is 
what is the problem that there is no agreement good enough upon which they 
agree that ‘we ask for you to help us and maybe when you have helped us there 
may be something that you will need to get for helping us’. 
Interviewer: Yes. 
CAB 1: This is also our knowledge and it is now not clear enough.  The problem here is 
that no agreement has been made. 
 
Ermine et al. (2004) recommended that “research agreements need to be negotiated and 
formalised with authorities of various Indigenous jurisdictions before any research is conducted 
with their people” (p.8).  This was part of recommendations made after three major granting 
agencies, namely, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Council, and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Council, engaged in a process of 
critical reflectivity upon their own policies and guidelines of working with indigenous people’s 
lived experiences and their knowledge (Ermine et al., 2004).  This is exactly what the 
participants of this research recommended as a way of working together cohesively.  In this, the 
community members, especially the traditional healers and CAB members, revealed their 
unwillingness to continue as passive owners of their indigenous people, which has been their role 
in research in the past decades.  They now want to sit down and start a conversation with the ex-
colonisers and negotiate as equals because they (indigenous people) are starting to realise that 
they have plenty to offer to the research process as are researchers, thus making them not the 
only ones entitled to reap the research benefits (Ermine et al., 2004). 
 
The discussion facilitated prior the research would help all the research stakeholders come out 
with a Memorandum of Understanding documenting the whole research process and the 




studied and the community at large (Ermine et al., 2004).  These agreements can only be reached 
if all research stakeholders are given adequate and sufficient information with regards to the 
research, especially for the research participants to give informed consent (Schulz-Baldes et al., 
2007).  The agreements reached also need to be publicised to all community members to allow 
for the study to be transparent and reduce exploitation (Emanuel et al., 2004; Ermine et al., 2004; 
Schulz-Baldes et al., 2007).  If done this way, the research has more chances of having sustained 
effects in that community because community members will feel empowered, respected 
culturally and otherwise, be included in all decisions made, thus greater sense of ownership of 
the research process and outcomes is likely to develop (Ermine et al., 2004).  The community 
members, especially the traditional healers, will not need to hide their knowledge for fear of it 
being appropriated or misrepresented because they will be active participants, as they should be 
with regards to their indigenous knowledge.  
 
4.3. Conclusion  
A presentation and discussion of the main and sub-themes that emerged in this study has been 
offered in this chapter.  It has been shown that all stakeholders conceptualised ethical dilemmas 
and their resolution in similar ways.  However, the justifications of the ethical dilemmas differed 
depending on their position in research.  The imbalance or discrepancies that occur because of 
unfair distribution of research benefits; the differences between communal and individual 
ownership of knowledge and the different ways of understanding were all conceived to be the 
sources of ethical dilemmatic situations in research.  Mechanisms for ethical problem resolution, 
such as the legalistic framework, were presented, but it also contradicts with the African 





CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The purpose of this study was to understand how different stakeholders, namely researchers, 
community members and representatives define and understand ethically problematic scenarios.  
Hypothetical case scenarios drawn from the literature were presented to participants, followed by 
questions.  The intention was to understand how the process of ethical decision-making was 
related to autonomous and relational conceptions of the self or, more specifically, the tensions in 
ethical decision-making as a result of these competing conceptions of the self.  The assumption 
was that people’s participation in various cultural systems has a bearing on their definitions of 
what constitutes ethical and moral behaviour (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto, 2003, 
2006; Triandis, 1989). 
 
The findings of this study indicated that participants understood ethical dilemmas with reference 
to benefit sharing, tensions between communal and individual ownership of knowledge, and the 
differences between scientific/empirical and revealed approaches to knowledge validation.  The 
issue of injustice and unfairness in research, which may lead to the appropriation of indigenous 
knowledge, was strongly expressed by the participants as something very common in research 
studies.  Ethical dilemmas were also perceived to arise from tensions between communal and 
individual ownership of knowledge.  In these two systems, knowledge is handled and valued 
rather differently and this is bound to cause an ethical dilemma when the two worldviews meet. 
The African and Western ways of knowing and validating knowledge, the former being 
traditional and the latter scientific, were found to be incompatible at times, thus also causing 
conflict when they meet.  Research processes, especially those done on indigenous people, are 
often confronted with these ethical dilemmas which sometimes question the validity and 
reliability of that study.  Three mechanisms for combating these ethical dilemmas were 
suggested by the research participants, namely, the legalistic versus the traditional framework, 





5.1. Implications for Ethics Codes 
This study raised significant issues that need to be considered when researchers are 
conceptualising a research study aimed at participants outside of their contexts. 
a) The ethical codes must address the context within which ethical dilemmas arise; 
b) Ethical codes need to revisit their strict adherence to individuality and also consider 
factors such as spirituality and connectedness to a range of other factors; 
c) Research ethics need to acknowledge the interplay of contextual, historical and cultural 
factors in decision-making; 
d) Indigenous ontology, cosmology and epistemology should be acknowledged and 
respected.   
 
5.2. Implications for Research 
The positivist account or the “old order of research” (Ermine et al., 2004, p.13), which infers that 
indigenous people’s “social reality is open to outside observations and can be objectively studied 
rather than being constructed by the perceptions and experiences of its members” (Hall & Hall, 
1996, p.38), does not serve the interests of indigenous people being studied but prioritises the 
needs and interests of researchers, and to some extent the funding institutes.  The application of 
this scientific model can be to the detriment of indigenous people and their knowledge.  
Therefore, different methods that will endeavour to recognise the survival thrust of indigenous 
people need to be applied.  This calls for the use of qualitative research methods, which permit 
negotiation of cultural spaces (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).  Participatory methods are also useful 
because they allow for learning through practice, which is one of the core values of African and 
other non-Western cultures.  Community representatives in this study called for more 
collaborative research, where researchers and community members work jointly for mutual 




members playing a significant role from the inception of the study plays a crucial role in the 
success of the research study (Ermine et al., 2004). 
5.3. Implications for Theory 
Alternative epistemologies need to be recognised and acknowledge as vital in mainstream 
psychology and other fields of study.  The emerging paradigms in these different fields of study 
need to utilise indigenous knowledge systems and worldviews for the benefit of the discipline.  
This will offer a much broader understanding and acknowledge the similarities and differences 
that exist between persons of different cultures.  Thus, a shift from universalism to culture-
specific and sensitive paradigms and theories needs to occurs.  This will permit the restoration of 
indigenous systems that collapsed due to the negative impact that colonisation and apartheid had 
on them. Indigenous knowledge can once again be visible and despite domination by the 
Western epistemologies (Ermine et al., 2004).   
 
5.4. Recommendations for Further Research Studies 
In light of the conclusions reached and the implications of this study, it is recommended that 
ethical dilemmas be considered with regards to situational factors at play.  
• The interaction between  research participants or the community serving as a focal point 
of research and the researchers prior to the research study;  
• How visible are the CAB members in indigenous communities; 
• CABs’ perceptions of their roles in the ethics of research; 
• CABs and community involvement in the development of research guidelines, rules and 





5.5. Limitations  
The sample of this study consisted of three researchers, two CAB members and four community 
members, who were all black South Africans.  This sample was too small to allow for 
generalisation to other groups of aforementioned research stakeholders.  This was consistent with 
the aim of the study, which was not to generalise but to get in-depth narratives of these different 
stakeholders with regards to what constitutes an ethical dilemma, and exploring how they engage 
in ethical decision-making.  The sample was also not diverse enough resulting in participants 
associating predominantly with the communal or relational self than the individualistic or 
autonomous self. 
 
It might also be argued that the scenario was leading, but it is based on many real life dilemmas 
that have emerged between indigenous healers and international researchers. 
 
5.6. Concluding Remarks 
The key objective of this study was to understand how different stakeholders, namely 
researchers, community members and representatives define and understand ethically 
problematic scenarios, with reference to autonomy and relatedness in ethical decision-making.  A 
hypothetical case scenario drawn from the literature was presented to participants, followed by 
questions.  The results of this study indicate that all stakeholders have common conceptions of 
what constitute ethical dilemmas, possibly because they were all black South Africans, 
identifying more with the African conception of the self.  The laws and regulations that were 
introduced to protect indigenous people’s knowledge systems were conceived, by the 
participants, to be working against indigenous people because of their detachment from the 
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APPENDIX A: ENGLISH SCENARIO: OWNERSHIP OF KNOWLEDGE  
 
A group of traditional healers from five villages at kwa-Nongoma have been 
working in collaboration to try and come up with medicine that will cure 
HIV/AIDS. They formed this group 3 years ago and they have been working very 
hard with a lot of dedication to this project. At the beginning, they had 10 plants 
that they found to be more helpful in their own practices in diminishing the 
symptoms of HIV/AIDS but they found that none of them could completely cure a 
person. Their project involved mixing some of these plants in the hope that they 
would come up with a strong mixture that would be the cure for HIV/AIDS. This 
time, they thought they were very close to getting the cure. A researcher from one 
of the major local Universities, who is working in collaboration with a major 
international pharmaceutical company, hears about this project. He approaches the 
traditional healers and asks them if they could have some of these plants so that 
they could be take them to the laboratory in order to isolate the active chemical 
agents. 
 
The traditional healers did not like this but they were persuaded easily as they were 
told about a machine that could determine if there is something useful in these 
plants within a shorter period of time, and they have been doing this project for 3 
years now. They thus agreed. The plants were found to have active chemicals that 
could actually boost the immune system. The researcher and the pharmaceutical 
company went back to the traditional healers for more of these plants. They wanted 
to do more tests on these plants, in order to develop a product that could be 
patented and made available to more people. There was a big conflict between 
them because of access to plants. The researcher and the pharmaceutical company 
were of the view that the plants were common property and as such, did not belong 
to any particular group. On the other hand, the traditional healers pointed to the 
fact that the plants had been used by healers for traditional healing purposes for 
many generations. They objected to the patenting of their knowledge for 
commercial purposes. They also felt that this violated their beliefs about healing, 







APPENDIX B: ENGLISH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
Questions 
a) What do you think is the problem here and how might it be solved? 
b) Who should have access to the plants or the knowledge associated with them? 
c) Who owns which part of traditional healing knowledge? 
d) Ethically, what is at risk for all the parties involved? 
1. What is at risk for the traditional healer? 
2. What s at risk for the researcher? 
3. What is at risk for the pharmaceutical company? 
4. What is at risk for the environment and the people who reside in this area? 
e) What does this case inform us about ownership of knowledge? 
f) Taking this scenario into consideration, what things constitute an ethical dilemma?  
g) What does it also tell us about the processes of healing and ethics? 










APPENDIX C: ISIZULU SCENARIO – OWNERSHPI OF KNOWLEDGE  
Iqembu labalaphi bendabuko abasuka ezigcemeni ezinhlanu zakwa-Nongoma 
bebesebenza ngokubambisana ukuzama ukuthola ikhambi lokwelapha ingculazi. 
Leliqembu lasungulwa eminyakeni emithathu edlule futhi belisebenza ngokukhulu 
ukuzikhandla ukuze lifeze izinhloso zalo. Ekuqaleni, belinemithi eyishumi alathola 
ukuthi yabe ikwazi ukunciphisa izimpawu zengculazi kodwa ingayelaphi 
ngokuphelele. Uhlelo lwabo kwakungelokuhlanganisa lemithi abanayo ngenhloso 
yokuthaka ikhambi elingalapha ingculazi ngokuphelele. Ngalesisikhathi, babebona 
sengathi sebeseduzane  kakhulu ekutheni bathole lelikhambi. Umcwaningi mumbe 
osuka kwesinye sezikhungo zemfundo ephakeme, owayesebenza ngokubambisana 
nenkampani yezamakhambi esuka phesheya, wezwa ngandlebenye ngaloluhlelo 
lwalabelaphi. Wabe esezama ukugxumana nalabelaphi bendabuko wababuza 
ukuthi bangamnikeza yini ezinye zalezizitshalo abazitholile ukuze ayozihlola 
ukuthi iziphi izithako zazo ezisebenzayo nokuthi bazicozulule lezozithako.  
Abalaphi laba babengakuzwisisi kahle lokhu kodwa bagcina bevume kalula nje 
emva kokuthi behehwe ngemishini ekuyiyona engakwazi ukuthi ibonakalise ukuthi 
zikhona yini izithako ezingasetshenziswa emva kwesikhashana esincane nje, 
njengoba bona base besebenze iminyaka emithathu. Ekuboneni lokhu bavuma-ke. 
Kwatholakala ukuthi izitshalo lezi zazinezithako ezikwazi ukusimamisa amasosha 
omzimba. Umcwaningi kanye nenkampani yezamakhambi bathathe sengathi yibo 
abathole lezizitshalo. Lomcwaningi kanye nenkampani le baphindela kubalaphi 
bendabuko ukuze bathole ezinye zalezizitshalo. Babefuna ukuzicwaninga 
ngokuphindelele lezizitshalo ukuze bakwazi ukuthi bakhe ikhambi labo 
ababezolihlola kwabanye abantu bese beyalidayisa. Kwabakhona ingxabano 
ngokuthi ubani ovumeleke ukuba athathe lezizitshalo. Umcwaningi kanye 
nenkampani yamakhambi babethi amakhambi lawa avuleleke kuwowonke umuntu, 
ngakho-ke akekho umuntu ongathi ezakhe. Ngakolunye uhlangothi, abalaphi 
bendabuko bathi phela lezi izitshalo abebelokhu bezisebenzisa ukwelapha abantu 
kusukela esikhathi samandulo. Baphikisana futhi nangokusetshenziswa kolwazi 
lwazo ukuze kuzuze abathile ngezomnotho. Babezizwa futhi benukubezekile 







APPENDIX D: ISIZULU QUESTIONS 
Imibuzo: 
a). Ucabanga ukuthi yini inkinga ekhona lapha futhi ingaxazululwa kanjani?  
b). Ubani okumele athole lezizitshalo kanye nolwazi oluhambisana nalo? 
c). Ubani ophethe luphi uhlangothi lokulapha ngokwendabuko? 
d). Ngokunobulungiswa, ucabanga ukuthi ikuphi okusengcupheni kubo bonke ababalekayo 
kulesisimo? 
 1. Yini esengcupheni kubalaphi bendabuko? 
 2. Yini esengcupheni kumcwaningi? 
 3. Yini esengcupheni enkampanini yezamakhambi? 
 4. Yini esengcupheni endaweni kanye nakubantu abahlala kuyona? 
e). Lelicala lisitshelani mayelana nokuphathwa kolwazi? 
f). Liphinde lisitsheleni ngokulashwa kwabantu kanye nobulungiswa? 
g). Ngokombono wakho, ucabanga ukuthi kumele kwenziwe njani noma iyiphi indlela okumele 
isetshenziswe ukuze kumelwane nezimo/nto ezifana nalezi? 
i). Ubani okumele abe yingxenye yalokhu? 






APPENDIX E: ISIZULU PROJECT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM  
Isihloko: Autonomy, relatedness and ethics: Perspectives from 
researchers, community members and community representatives 
Inombolo yocwaningo: 1 
Umcwaningi: Pinky Zibuyile Majola 
Isizinda: University Of 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Indawo: Umgungundlovu Ucingo: 0734012711 
Umphathi: Professor N.J. Mkhize 
Isizinda: University Of 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Indawo: Umgungundlovu  Ucingo: 033-260 5963 
Ngiyakubingelela, 
Lapha senza uphando lapho sibheke ukwazi khona ukuthi ngabe abantu besenza kanjani isinqumo uma 
bebhekene nesimo lapho kunokushayisana kwemibono enobulungiswa phakathi. Lolucwaningo luyindlela 
yokuthola ulwazi ngendlela abantu bethatha ngayo izinqumo ezimpilweni zabo nokuthi yiziphi izinto 
abazibhekelelayo uma bezothatha lezizinqumo. 
Uyamenywa ukuba ubambe iqhaza kulolucwaningo. Uma ubamba iqhaza, umcwaningi uzokufundela 
udatshana lapho kukhona umlingiswa noma abalingiswa okumele bathathe isinqumo esithile. Kuzobe 
sekuba khona imibuzo ezolandela kamumva kwendatshana ngayinye. Lezi zindatshana zizoba zizine (4) 
kuphela kanti kungathatha isikhathi esingangemizuzu engamashumi amahlanu. 
Ukubamba iqhaza kwakho kulolucwaningo ngeke kube okuyingozi. Loluphando ngeke lube namthelela 
kumuntu ngamunye kodwa umthelela walo uzokuba ekusimamiseni ulwazi olusafufusa lwezifundo 
zobulungiswa emphakathini wonkana.  
Ukubamba iqhaza akuyona impoqo futhi ngeke kuze kube nemiphumela emibi uma ungathandi 
ukuzimbandakanya kulolucwaningo. Ukuzibandakanya kwakho kulolucwaningo kuzogcinwa kuyimfihlo 
ngokungavezi imininigwane engadalula umuntu siqu sakhe. Uma unemibuzo ngalolucwaningo, 
uyakhuthazwa ukuba uthintane nabalobwe ngenhla. Ngiyabonga kakhulu ngesikhathi sakho. 
Yimi ozithobayo,  




ISIZULU INFORMED CONSENT 
 
University of KwaZulu-Natal 
      School of Psychology 
      Private Bag X01 
      Scottsville 
      3209 
 
Mnumzane/Nkosazana ehloniphekileyo 
Ngingumfundi esizindeni sezemfundo ephakeme saKwaZulu-Natali. Njengengxenye yezifundo zami, 
kumele ngenze ucwaningo ngizwe izimvo mayelana nesihloko esithile. Inhloso yocwaningo lwami 
ukwazi kabanzi ngokuthi abantu bazenza kanjani izinqumo uma bebhekene nezimo lapho 
kunokungqubuzana kwemibono ethintana nobulungiswa, noma uma unembeza wabo uphikisana nabafuna 
ukukwenza. Ngizokuxoxela udatshana lapho kukhona umlingiswa okuzomele axazulule isimo azobe 
ehlangabezane naso, lapho kumele enze isinqumo esinzima. Izindatshana lezi zizoba zizine (4). Ngayinye 
izobe ilandelwa imibuzo ezobe iqondene nayo. Lengxoxo izothatha cishe imizuzu engu –50. Ingxoxo 
yonke izoqoshwa ngesi-qophamazwi, bese ibuye ibhalwe njengoba injalo ukuze ihlaziywe. 
Ukuzibandakanya kulolucwaningo kungokukhululekile, akunampoqo. Inkulumo-ngxoxo iyohlelwa 
ngesikhathi esihambisana nawe. Ngaso sonke isikhathi umcwaningi uyokuhlonipha ukuba yimfihlo 
kwayo yonke imininingwane ecoshelwe kule-nkulumo-ngxoxo.  
Uma kwenzeka ushintsha umqondo wakho mayelana nokuzibandakanya, unelungelo lokuhoxa noma 
inini, ngisho noma ucwaningo seluqalile. Umcwaningi uyolihlonipha lelilungelo ngaso sonke isikhathi: 
Ukuhoxa kwakho angeke kube nomthelela omubi kuwe. 
Imiphumela yalolucwaningo iyobhalwa ngokufingqiwe. Yize kunokwenzeka ukuthi kucashunwe 
engxoxweni yakho njengoba injalo ukucacisa amaphuzu athile, imininingwane ebalula umuntu ngamunye 
iyogodlwa. 
Uma ufisa ukubamba iqhaza kulolucwaningo, uyacelwa ukuba ulobe igama lakho uphinde usayinde 
emgqeni ngezansi. 
Mina …………………………………..(igama) ngiyavuma ngokukhululekile ukubamba iqhaza 
kulolucwaningo oluchazwe ngasenhla. Ngichazeliwe inhloso yocwaningo nokuthi lubandakanya ini. 
Ngiyaqonda ukuthi ngingahoxa noma inini uma ngifisa.  
…………………………..  …………………………….  ……………… 
Sayinda    Indawo     Usuku 
Ngiyabonga kakhulu ukuthola lelithuba lokukhuluma nawe. 
Yimi ozithobayo,  




APPENDIX F: ENGLISH PROJECT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM  
Project Title: Autonomy, relatedness and ethics: Perspectives from 
researchers, community members and community representatives 
Project Number: 1 
Researcher: Pinky Zibuyile Majola 
Organization: University Of 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Location: Pietermaritzburg Phone: 0734012711 
Project Supervisor: Professor N.J. Mkhize 
Organization: University Of 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Location: Pietermaritzburg Phone: 033-260 5963 
Greetings 
We are doing research where we want to learn how people make decisions when they are faced with an 
ethical or moral dilemma. Research is a process by which we try to find answers to (an) important 
question (s).This research is a way of finding the process which people embark on in their lives when they 
are making decisions, such as the factors they take into consideration in making the said decision. 
You are invited to participate in this research. If you participate, the researcher will read to you a short 
scenario where there is an actor or actors whom will have to make a decision. There will be questions that 
will follow each scenario. There will be 4 scenarios in total. This might take approximately 50 minutes in 
total. 
Your participation will not expose you to any dangerous risks. This research will not have any benefits for 
each individual, but it will contribute to the growing body of ethical knowledge in general. 
Your participation is voluntary; there will be no penalties if you do not wish to participate in this research. 
Your participation in this study will be kept confidential by not giving identifying information will not be 
given out in the process of reporting about the study, nor for any other purpose. 
If you have any questions about this study you are urged to contact the people mentioned above. Thank 
you for your time. 





ENGLISH CONSENT FORM 
University of KwaZulu-Natal 
      School of Psychology 
      Private Bag X01 
      Scottsville 
      3209 
Dear Sir/Madam 
I am a student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. As part of my studies I have to conduct 
research on a particular topic. The purpose of this research is to find out how people engage in 
the process of decision-making when they are faced with a conflicting situation or if their 
conscience conflicts with what they want to do. I will read to you a scenario where there will be 
a person who will have to resolve an ethical dilemma (i.e. the person is faced with a difficult 
decision to make). There will be 4 scenarios. Each one will be followed by questions relating to 
it. The interview will last approximately 50 minutes. The interview will be recorded by a tape 
recorder and later be transcribed verbatim so that it can be analyzed.  
Your participation in this research is voluntary. The date and time of the interview will be 
organized to suit you. The researcher will keep all the information given as part of this research 
confidential at all times. 
Should you change your mind about partaking in this research, you have a right to withdraw at 
any time, even when the research is in process. The researcher will respect you decision at all 
times: Your withdrawal will not have any negative consequences. 
The results of this research will be abridged. Although it may happen that extracts will be taken 
from your interview to clarify certain points, no identifying information will be given. 
Should you wish to participate you are urged to write your name and sign below. 
I ……………………………… (name) give consent to participate in this research explained 
above. Reasons for this research have been fully explained to me, including what it entails. I 
understand that I can withdraw anytime I wish to. 
……………………………….    ………………………………… …………………….. 
Signature     Place     Date 
Yours truly, Ms P. Z. Majola 
 
 
